Journal of the National Association of
Administrative Law Judiciary
Volume 26

Issue 1

Article 2

3-15-2006

An Overview of Whistleblower Protection Claims at the United
States Department of Labor
William Dorsey

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/naalj
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, and the Labor and Employment Law Commons

Recommended Citation
William Dorsey, An Overview of Whistleblower Protection Claims at the United States Department of
Labor, 26 J. Nat’l Ass’n Admin. L. Judiciary Iss. 1 (2006)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/naalj/vol26/iss1/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Caruso School of Law at Pepperdine Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law
Judiciary by an authorized editor of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
bailey.berry@pepperdine.edu.

An Overview of Whistleblower Protection Claims at the
United States Department of Labor
William Dorsey*

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION
STATUTES AND THEIR REGULATIONS ......................................... 47

A . Environment .....................................................................

48

B. Transportation.......................................................................

49

C. Securities................................................................................

50

D. Whistleblower ProtectionMatters Under the Secretary 's
JurisdictionNot Heardat the Office ofAdministrativeLaw
Judges..........................................................................................

50

1. Section 11 (c) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act
(O SH Act) ................................................................................

50

2. Statutes like § 11 (c) of the OSH Act ..................................

51

E. PracticalGroupingsof OALJ Whistleblower Statutes........... 52
II.

PRECURSOR AND SIMILAR WORKER PROTECTION STATUTES ......

55

A. EarlierEmployee ProtectionStatutes......................................

55

1. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act ........................................

55

2. The National Labor Relations Act ......................................

57

3. Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 .........................

57

44

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges

26-1

B. Whistleblower Acts Outside the Secretary ofLabor's
Jurisdiction.....................................................................................

58

1. Whistleblower Protection for Federal Workers ..................

58

2. The Banking-Related Acts ..................................................

59

III. ESSENTIAL CONCEPTS ...................................................................

60

A. Intent is Everything..................................................................

60

1. Direct Proof of Discrimination ...........................................

60

a) A vailability .....................................................................

60

b) Direct Proof: Can you know it when you hear it? ........ 62
c) Applying the Definitions of Direct Evidence ................ 68
2. Circumstantial Evidence of Retaliation ..............................

70

3. Burden of Proof ..................................................................

71

a) Direct Proof of Discrimination ........................................

71

b) Circumstantial Proof of Discrimination .........................

71

4. Allocation of BOP Does not Dictate the Order of Proof ....... 72
B. The Complainant'sPrimaFacie Case...................................
1. Status .................................................................................

73
. . 73

2. Protected Activity ................................................................
a) Intra-corporate Disclosures are Protected .......................

74
76

b) Employer Cannot Require Internal Report Before
Employee Reports to Government ......................................

77

c) Employee's Motive for Reporting to Government is
Irrelevant to Protection .......................................................

78

d) No Actual Violation is Required for Protection .............

78

3. Adverse Action ..................................................................
a) The Nuclear/Environmental Acts and AIR 21 ...............

79
79

Overview of Whistleblower Protection Claims

45

b) The SO X A ct ..................................................................

81

c) The STA A A ct ................................................................

81

d) Tangible Job Sequences .................................................

82

Spring 2006

4. Causal Connection .............................................................

85

a) Chronology .......................................................................

86

b) K now ledge .......................................................................

88

5. A Prima Facie Case Made with Circumstantial Evidence
Raises a Rebuttable Presumption of Discrimination .............. 89
C. The Employer's Burden of Going Forward..........................

91

D. Complainant'sProofofPretext.............................................

92

E. Mixed Motive Cases................................................................

95

1. Civil Rights Amendments of 1991 .....................................

97

2. ERA Amendments .............................................................

98

IV. WHISTLEBLOWER DAMAGES AND REMEDIES .............................

98

A. Reinstatement............................................................................

99

1. Preliminary Orders in ERA Cases .........................................

100

2. Stays of Preliminary Reinstatement Ordered by OSHA in
AIR 21, SOX and Pipeline Safety Matters .................................

101

B. After-Acquired Evidence of Misconduct ...................................

103

C. Back Pay and Other Terms, Conditions, andPrivilegesof
Employm ent ......................................................................................

104

1. Burdens of Proof on Items Granted as Relief ....................... 105
2. Interim Earnings and Mitigation of Damages ....................... 105
3. Tax C onsequences ..................................................................

106

4. Prejudgm ent Interest ..............................................................

106

5. Other Terms, Conditions and Privileges of Employment ..... 106

46

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges

26-1

D. CompensatoryDamages...........................................................

107

1. Elements Included ..................................................................

107

2. Setting a Compensatory Award .............................................

109

E. Exemplary Damages...................................................................

109

F. Equitable-typeRelief .................................................................

110

G. Litigation Expenses....................................................................

111

V. A FEW PROCEDURAL MATTERS ......................................................

112

A. Whistleblower Complaints.........................................................

112

B. The Administrative Review Board............................................

113

1. The Board's Standard of Review ..........................................

114

a) ERA Cases ..........................................
114
b) All Other Cases ..................................................................

115

2. Approvals of Adjudicatory Settlements by the Board or the
Presiding ALJ..............................................................................

115

C. Hearings at the Office ofAdministrative Law Judges.............. 117
1. Expedited Proceedings ...........................................................

117

2. Subpoenas ............................................
118
3. Trial Evidence ........................................................................

120

VI. CONCLUSION .................................................................................. 121

Spring 2006

I.

Overview of Whistleblower Protection Claims

THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION
STATUTES AND THEIR REGULATIONS

Employees who expose corporate and governmental malfeasance
provide a valuable public service, forcing institutions and managers to
correct the transgressions brought to light. In 2002, three of them
shared Time Magazine's encomium as People of the Year: Cynthia
Cooper of WorldCom and Sherron Watkins of Enron, who both
exposed corporate financial scandals, and FBI Special Agent Coleen
Rowley, who complained to the FBI Director about the FBI
Headquarters' mishandling of field information about terrorism
suspects before the September 11, 2001 attacks. But whistleblowers
often are fired in retribution for their revelations, and suffer continuing
financial hardship as they struggle to acquire new jobs, finding
themselves branded as eccentric, if not traitorous, employees. Those
who are not terminated may be ostracized, demoted, transferred to
dead-end positions, or saddled with false performance evaluations that
inexorably culminate in firing.
Most Americans hold their jobs at the will of their employer; they
may be terminated at any time, for any reason - or for no reason at all.'
Congress modified this traditional doctrine of at-will employment
through a variety of statutes designed to shield whistleblowers from
vengeful employment actions.
Many offer administrative relief
overseen by the U. S. Secretary of Labor, rather than the remedies in
Article III trial courts. This article gives an overview of whistleblower
protection adjudications at the U.S. Department of Labor's Office of
Administrative Law Judges.
Section I introduces the whistleblower protection statutes that give
rise to the complaints adjudicated by the Secretary of Labor.2 Section
II reviews earlier statutes that have protected employees from job
retaliation and identifies several whistleblower statutes the Secretary of
Labor does not administer, but refers to for guidance in interpreting and
applying her employee protection programs; these statutes may permit
* Administrative Law Judge, U.S. Department of Labor. The opinions
expressed are the author's, not those of the Department of Labor.
1. For a discussion of whistleblower protections enacted by the states, see
Robert G. Vaughn, State Whistleblower Statutes and the Future of Whistleblower
Protection, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 581 (1999).
2. See infra notes 8-56 and accompanying text.
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judicial remedies. 3 Section III familiarizes the reader with key concepts
in whistleblower protection litigation. 4 Among these are the need to
prove intentional retaliation, and the distinction between direct and
circumstantial proof of discrimination that affects whether the
evidentiary presentation will rely on the McDonnell Douglas5
framework for burdens of proof and production to present a sufficient
case. Section IV explores the types of relief that may be ordered to
abate a violation, which includes reinstatement before a final decision
under some statutes, and the monetary damages available to successful
complainants.
Section IV explores the remedies and monetary
damages available to successful complainants.6 Section V highlights
procedural matters that will interest lawyers representing workers
or defending employers at the Office
claiming whistleblower protection
7
Judges.
Law
of Administrative
A tension between looking for commonalities in these employee
protection statutes and appreciating subtle differences among the Acts
will permeate the discussion.
The Office of Administrative Law Judges (OALJ) adjudicates
disputes under eleven of the fourteen whistleblower statutes the
This jurisdiction encompasses
Secretary of Labor administers.
employers in three spheres of the economy: the environment,
transportation, and securities.
A. Environment
Eight statutes protect employees from retaliation when they
report unsafe or unlawful practices by their employers that adversely
affect the environment. They are as follows:
1. Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 (ERA); 8
9
2. Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972;

3. Some of the statutes discussed in Section II permit direct judicial remedies.

See infra notes 57-79 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 80-258 and accompanying text.
5. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
6. See infra notes 259-342 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 343-400 and accompanying text.
8. Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-438, 92 Stat. 2951
(1978) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5851 (2005)).
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3. Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976;I1
4. Solid Waste Disposal Act of 1976;"
5. Clean Air Act of 1977;12
6. Comprehensive13 Environmental Response, Compensation &
Liability Act of 1980;
14
7. Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002 (Pipeline Safety);
8. Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974. "
B. Transportation
Two statutes protect employees in the transportation industry. The
16
first is the 1982 Surface Transportation Assistance Act (STAA).
Employees in the trucking industry are protected from job

9. Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, §2, 86
Stat. 890 (1972) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1367 (1972)).
10. Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2044
(1976) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 2622 (1986)).
11. Solid Waste Disposal Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 89-272, Title II, §7001
(1976) (codified as amended 42 U.S.C. § 6971 (1980)).
12. Clean Air Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95- 95, Title 1II, § 312, 91 Stat. 783
(1977) (codified as amended 42 U.S.C. § 7622 (1977)).
13. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation & Liability Act
of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, Title I, § 110, 94 Stat. 2787 (1980) (codified as
amended 42 U.S.C. § 9610 (1980)).
14. Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-355, § 6(a), 116
Stat. 2989 (2002) (codified at 49 U.S.C.A §60129 (2002)).
15. Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93- 523, § 2(a), 88 Stat.
1691 (1974) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 300j-9(i) (West 1994)).
16. Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-272, §
1(e), 108 Stat. 990 (1994) (codified at 49 U.S.C.A. § 31105 (West 1994)). Older
STAA cases will cite to an earlier codification. In the summer of 1994, Congress
passed legislation "to restate in comprehensive form, without substantive change,
certain general and permanent laws relating to transportation... and to make other
technical improvements in [Title 49 of the United States] Code." H.R. REP. No.
180, (1994), as reprintedin 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 818. The former codification of
the Surface Transportation Assistance Act at 49 U.S.C. app. § 2305 was
renumbered to 49 U.S.C.A. § 31105. According to the Section-By-Section
Summary, in the process several words and phrases considered to be unclear or
surplusage were eliminated or changed. See H.R. REP. No. 180, (1993), as
reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 818, 1008-1009. The legislative history shows
there was no intention to alter the substantive law. H.R. REP. No. 180, at 191-92
(1993), as reprintedin 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 818, 822.
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discrimination for actions relating to commercial motor vehicle safety
and health. 17
The second statute that protects employees in this industry is the
Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st
Century (AIR 21). 18 Employees of air carriers, their contractors and
subcontractors who provide information about air safety violations to
their employer or the federal government are protected.
C. Securities
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX)' 9 was enacted as § 806 of the
Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002.20
Employees who disclose or complain about fraudulent activity that can
mislead investors in publicly traded companies are protected. 21
D. Whistleblower ProtectionMatters Under the Secretary's
JurisdictionNot Heardat the Office ofAdministrative Law
Judges
Under three acts, the Secretary of Labor may seek relief on a
whistleblower's behalf in a United States District Court, rather than
through administrative proceedings.
1. Section 1l(c) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSH
Act)

17. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1978 (2004).
18. AIR 21, Pub. L. No. 106-181, Title V, § 519(a), 114 Stat. 145 (2000)
(codified at 49 U.S.C.A. § 42121 (West 2000)).
19. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Pub. L. No. 107-204, Title VIII, § 806(a), 116 Stat.
802 (2002) (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 1514A (West 2002)).
20. Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 101-650,
Title III, § 321, 104 Stat. 5117 (1990) (codified as amended 18 U.S.C. § 1501
(2002)). The SOX Act amended a number of statutes, including the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1933, the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, the Investment
Advisors Act of 1940, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, and the
federal Criminal Code.
21. Implementing regulations are published at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1980 (2004).
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Employers must keep workplaces free from hazards recognized "as
likely to cause their employees serious physical harm or death., 22 The
whistleblower protection rdgime created in § 11(c) of the OSH Act
redresses reprisals against workers who complain to Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), seek or participate in an
OSHA inspection, or participate or testify in any proceeding related to
an OSHA inspection. 23 OSHA investigates more than 1,000 of these
discrimination complaints from workers each year.
Section 11(c) of the OSH Act offers whistleblowers no private right
of action. 24
If OSHA determines a complaint is well founded, the
Secretary has discretion to file a civil action in a United States district
court seeking the employee's rehiring, reinstatement or other
appropriate relief.25 Workers' attempts to force the Secretary to sue on
26
their behalf have proven unsuccessful.
2. Statutes like § 11(c) of the OSH Act
The OSH Act served as the model for two other whistleblower
protection statutes. First, Congress implemented the International
Convention for Safe Containers of December 2, 1972, by forbidding
discrimination against employees who report unsafe shipping
containers or other violations of the International Safe Container Act of
1977 to the Secretary of Transportation. 27
This whistleblower
protection provision, administered by the Secretary of Labor, mirrors
§ 11(c) of the OSH Act. The Secretary of Labor also adjudicates
complaints under the Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act of
1986, which prohibits state or local educational agencies from
22. See § 5 of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No.
101-650, Title III, § 321, 104 Stat. 5117 (1994) (codified as amended 29 U.S.C. §
651 (1999)).
23. Pub. L. No. 98-620, Title IV, § 402(32), 98 Stat. 3360 (1984) (codified at
29 U.S.C.A. § 660(c) (West 1994)).
24. See, e.g., Taylor v Brighton Corp., 616 F.2d 256, 264 (6th Cir. 1980);
Fletcher v. United Parcel Serv, 155 F.Supp. 2d 954, 957 (N. D. Ill. 2001); Kozar v.
A.T.& T., 923 F.Supp. 67, 69 (D.N.J. 1996).
25. § 660 (c)(2). See also 29 C.F.R. § 1977.3.
26. Wood v. Dep't. of Labor, 275 F.3d 107, 112 n. 9 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (rejecting a
worker's claim for relief against the Secretary when OSHA's investigation of a § 11 (c)
complaint found no violation).
27. See, e.g., 46 U.S.C. § 1506(c) (2004).
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discriminating against employees who provide information about
incorporates the
potential violations of that act. The statute specifically
28
procedures of § 11 (c) of the OSH Act as the remedy.
The Office of Administrative Law Judges has no role in these three
statutes; they will not be discussed further.
E. PracticalGroupingsof OALJ Whistleblower Statutes
Whistleblower protection acts share many features, but are
emphatically not cookie-cutter copies of one29 another. Congress has
refined its employment protections over time.
The whistleblower cases at the Office of Administrative Law
Judges may be grouped in different ways for different purposes.
Consider three examples:
1. Most acts require that the presiding judge review and approve
adjudicatory settlements. Three, however, do not: the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act,3" the Solid Waste Disposal Act, 3 1 and the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act.32
2. All acts allow successful employees to recover compensatory
Safe
damages, but only two permit punitive damage awards: 3the
4
Drinking Water Act 33 and the Toxic Substances Control Act.
3. The Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 2 1st Century
(AIR 21),35 SOX,3 6 and Pipeline Safety Act 37 provide for interim
reinstatement orders before trial, while the ERA permits
28. 15 U.S.C. § 265 1(b) (1998).
29. The development of the law is well chronicled from an employee's viewpoint
in two books: STEPHEN M. KOHN, CONCEPTS AND PROCEDURES IN WHISTLEBLOWER
LAW (Quorum Books 2001) (on whistleblower law generally), and STEPHEN M. KOHN
ET. AL, WHISTLEBLOWER LAW: A GUIDE TO LEGAL PROTECTIONS FOR CORPORATE

EMPLOYEES (Prager 2004) (on the Sarbanes-Oxley law specifically).
30. § 1367.
31. § 6971.
32. § 9610; see also infra notes 287-296 and accompanying text.
33. § 1367.
34. 15 U.S.C. § 2622 (1998); see also infra notes 243-260 and accompanying
text.
35. § 42121.
36. § 1514A
37. § 60129.
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reinstatement after trial but before the administrative law judge's
decision is reviewed by the Administrative Review Board.38
Despite considerable variations in their fine points, three broad
clusters of whistleblower protection acts emerge. The environmental
acts of the 1970's comprise the first group, which embody the original
Congressional approach to employee protection. Employees who rely
on them must prove retaliation without the benefit of any statutory
burden shifting provisions.
The second group is comprised of those statutes adjudicated by the
OALJ that incorporate burden shifting, first introduced by amendments
to the ERA by the Energy Policy Act of 1992. 39 Using that statute as
an example, the burden of persuasion falls first on the employee to
demonstrate that retaliation for a protected activity was a "contributing
factor" to the unfavorable personnel decision.4" The employee obtains
relief unless the employer counters with "clear and convincing
evidence" that it would have taken the same adverse action in the
absence of the protected activity.41
Congress introduced this paradigm to ameliorate what had become
known as the "Mt. Healthy" defense,42 named after the U. S. Supreme
43
Court decision in Mt. Healthy City Board of Education v. Doyle.
There a teacher without tenure rights claimed he was not re-hired
because he had criticized the school board's teacher dress code in the
media, while the board claimed it had other valid reasons not to renew

38. For more discussion, see infra notes 262-287 and accompanying text.
39. The Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub.L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776,
(1992).
40. § 5851(3)(d).
41. § 5851(b)(3)(D).
42. The Congressional Record indicates that the House and Senate conferees
intend to relieve whistleblowers from the burdens of proof enunciated in Mt.
Healthy v. Doyle. 138 CONG. REC. HI 1409 (October 5, 1992) (statement of Rep.
George Miller, Chairman, House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs) (citing
Mt. Healthy v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977) (plurality opinion)). The "clear and
convincing evidence" required of employers in mixed motive cases rejected Mt.
Healthy's more lenient preponderance of the evidence standard. See also Summary
of Statutory Changes to ERA Whistleblower Provisions, Proposed Amendments to
the Procedures for the Handling of Discrimination Complaints Under Federal
Employee Protection Statutes, 59 Fed. Reg. 12506, 12507 (March 16, 1994).
43. Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S at 274.
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the employment. 44 The Court held that, in order to obtain relief in a
mixed motive case; a public employee must show that constitutionally
protected speech was a "motivating factor" in the adverse employment
decision.45 The public employer may rebut this with proof by a
preponderance of evidence that it would have taken the same action had
the employee not engaged in constitutionally protected speech.46
Congress intended to hamper the defense of whistleblower claims
by employers in the nuclear industry with its "clear and convincing"
evidence standard, used whenever an employee established that
retaliation contributed in some part to an adverse employment action.
"Recent accounts of whistleblower harassment at both NRC licensee..
and [Department of Energy] nuclear facilities . . . suggest that

whistleblower harassment and retaliation remain all too common in
parts of the nuclear industry., 47

"These reforms," according to the

House Report, "are intended to address those remaining pockets of
resistance. '48 The Eleventh Circuit relied on this legislative history
when it affirmed the relief granted by Secretary of Labor to an
employee in a close case. 49 The procedures, burdens of proof, and
remedies in AIR 21 closely follow those Congress introduced in 1992
to the ERA. 50 The SOX Act explicitly incorporates AIR 21's rules
52
and procedures. 5' The Pipeline Safety act also follows this model.
The ERA and these more recent statutes (the Pipeline Safety, SOX, and
AIR 21 acts) form the second useful analytic group.
The STAA represents the third model. Its structure roughly
resembles the 1970's environmental whistleblower acts, and lacks any
burden shiffing provision. It also describes the circumstances where an

44. Id.
45. Id. at 287.
46. Id.
47. H. REP. No. 102-474(VIII), at 79 (1992), as reprinted in 1992
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1953, 2282, 2297.
48. Id.
49. Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp. v. Herman, 115 F.3d 1568 (11th Cir. 1997).
For more discussion on the shifting evidentiary burdens, see infra notes 220-229 and
accompanying text.
50. Compare the AIR 21 text in § 42121 (b)(2)(B) with the amended ERA
procedures at § 585 1(b)(3)(A) through (D).
51. § 1514A (b)(2)(A).
52. See § 60129(b)(2)(B)(iii) and (iv).
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employee may refuse a work assignment, which is permitted under the
ERA.53 It protects employees in making a complaint "related to a
violation of a commercial motor vehicle safety regulation, standard, or
order;, 5 4 "refus[ing] to operate a vehicle because . . . the operation
violates a regulation, standard, or order of the United States related to
commercial motor vehicle safety or health;" 55 or "refus[ing] to operate
a vehicle because ...

the employee has a reasonable apprehension of

serious injury to the employee or the public because of the vehicle's
56
unsafe condition.
II. PRECURSOR AND SIMILAR WORKER PROTECTION STATUTES

A. EarlierEmployee Protection Statutes
1. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
Whistleblower protection statutes generally have been patterned on
the portion of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,
that makes it "an unlawful employment practice for an employer.., to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."57 English v.
Whitfield directly analogized "retaliatory harassment" claims under the
employee protection provision of the ERA (42 U.S.C. §5851) to claims
of gender and race-based discrimination under Title VII. 58

The

Secretary of Labor, and later the Secretary's designee, the
Administrative Review Board (Board), have recognized that Title VII
uses almost identical language to describe prohibited retaliatory acts,
shares a common statutory origin with ERA. Both entities have looked
to Title VII decisions to guide their interpretations of the central text of
whistleblower statutes that forbid an employer to discharge a
53. Pensyl v. Catalytic Inc., 83-ERA-2 (Sec'y Jan. 13, 1984).
54. § 31105(a)(1)(A).
55. § 31105(a)(1)(B)(i).
56. § 31105(a)(1)(B)(ii). The Secretary's regulations at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1978 are
structured very differently than those implementing all the other whistleblower
statutes.
57. 78 Stat. 255 (1964), amended by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (2003).
58. English v. Whitfield, 858 F.2d 957, 963-64 (4th Cir. 1986).
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whistleblower or "otherwise discriminate . . . with respect 59to . . .
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.
The salient difference between retaliation claims under
whistleblower statutes and Title VII is that whistleblower protection
does not arise from an enduring characteristicof the plaintiff (race, sex,
national origin, faith, etc.), but rather from an activity: reporting safety
concerns about some activity that Congress believed merited special
protection, or, in the case of SOX, reporting fraud against
60
shareholders.
Amendments to Title VII in 199161 introduced disharmonies in the
burdens of proof required and remedies available under Title VII and
the Department of Labor's ERA, AIR 21, SOX, and Pipeline Safety
statutes. Readers must pay close attention to the statutory text at issue
in a Title VII decision to determine whether it may serve as precedent
for interpreting or applying the language of a current DOL
whistleblower statute.

59. Shelton v. Oak Ridge Nat'l Labs., No. 98-100, slip op. at 7 (ARB Mar. 30,
2001),
available
at
http://www.oalj.dol.gov/PUBLIC/ARB/DECISIONS/ARBDECISIONS/CAA/98_
100C (dismissing the complaint because the imposition of an employer's lowest
level of progressive that might culminate in removal (an "Oral Reminder") did not
qualify an adverse action that the Secretary could remedy); see also West v.
Kasbar, Inc., No. 04-155, slip op. at 4 (ARB Nov. 30, 2005), available at
http://www.oalj.dol.gov/PUBLIC/ARB/DECISIONS/ARB DECISIONS/STA/04_
155.STAP.PDF (dismissing a claim for the complainant's failure to allege any
tangible job consequence); Martin v. Dept. of the Army, No. 1996-131, slip op. at 7
(ARB
July
30,
1999),
available
at
http://www.oalj.dol.gov/PUBLIC/ARB/DECISIONS/ARBDECISIONS/SDW/96
_131.SDWP.PDF (finding the complainant failed to prove a constructive discharge,
but that the Army was liable for $75,000 as compensatory damages for his
emotional distress and attomey's fees).
60. An invaluable resource for research into Title VII law is BARBARA LINDEMAN
& PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DIsCRiMINATION LAW (BNA 3d ed. 1996) (C.
Geoffery Weirich ed.) and its 2002 Cumulative Supplement. Two updates after the
2002
supplement
are
available
at
http://www.bnabooks.com/ababna/word/grossmanwebversion.doc
and
http://www.bnabooks.com/ababna/word/seymourwebversion.doc.
61. Civil Rights Act of 1965, Title VII, § 701, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m),
amended by Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107(a), 105 Stat.
1071 (1991).
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2. The National Labor Relations Act
An even earlier statute that has protected workers engaged in
controversial workplace activities is the National Labor Relations Act
of 1947 (NLRA), as amended. The NLRA's anti-retaliation provisions
62
have served as a pattern for many whistleblower protection laws.
Case law applying this retaliation provision is particularly relevant to
whistleblower acts that were
interpretation of the environmental
63
explicitly modeled on it.
3. Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969
The Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 (CMIHSA) 64 is
another early act that includes a whistleblower protection provision
patterned on the anti-retaliation provisions of the NLRA.65 The
employee protection provisions of the ERA, the Clean Air Act and the
Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) share a common heritage with
the CMHSA's anti-discrimination provisions. 66 The Secretary has
relied on CMHSA decisions to substitute the remedy of economic
reinstatement for actual pre-trial reinstatement of an employee under
the AIR 21, SOX and Pipeline Safety acts when an employer proves the
employee presents a likely security risk.67

62. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3-4) (1998).
63. S. Rep. No. 414- 92 (1972), as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 374849. See also Ewald, 1989-SDW-1, slip op. at 7, 8 & n. 10.
64. 30 U.S.C. § 815(c)(1) (1986).
65. Munsey v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm., 595 F.2d 735, 74244 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (discussing the NLRA as the model for the CMHSA's antiretaliation provision).
66. See S. Rep. No. 848, 95 at 29, as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 7303;
122 CONG. REc. 8286-88 (1976) (statements of Sens. Tunney and Helms regarding
the TSCA bill S.3149); PA v. Catalytic, Inc., No. 1983-ERA-2, slip op. at 4 (Sec'y
Jan. 13, 1984) (regarding the Clean Air Act and the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act). See also Macowiak v. Univ. Nuclear Sys., Inc., 735 F.2d 1159 (9th
Cir. 1984) (recognizing that the CMHSA served as the model for the original ERA
statute); Passaic Valley Sewerage Comm'rs v. Dep't of Labor, 992 F.2d 474, 479
(3rd Cir. 1993) (recognizing parallels between the whistleblower provisions of
various environmental protection acts, the NLRA and mine safety legislation).
67. See infra notes 262-87 and accompanying text.
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B. Whistleblower Acts Outside the Secretary of Labor'sJurisdiction
Congress has not assigned the Secretary of Labor to administer and
enforce all federal whistleblower protections. Federal workers and
employees in the banking industry are protected separately. When their
statutory text is similar, decisions applying those acts offer insights into
the proper application of the DOL statutes.
1. Whistleblower Protection for Federal Workers
The Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 shields a federal
employee from a retaliatory personnel action for disclosing what the
employee reasonably believes are violations of law or instances of
gross mismanagement.68 In the disciplinary proceedings prosecuted
before the Merit Systems Protection Board, the employee need only
prove the disclosure was a "contributing factor" to the discipline, not its
predominate cause.6 9 Congress aids this showing with a statutory
knowledge/timing test.7" When the employee proves that the agency
manager taking the adverse action knew of the disclosure, and the
discipline's timing is such that a reasonable person could believe that
the disclosure contributed to it, the agency must prove by clear and
convincing evidence it would have taken the same action in the absence
of the protected disclosure.71
No whistleblower statute the Secretary of Labor administers
includes a similar knowledge/timing presumption. The second analytic
group of the Department's whistleblower statutes employ a similar
form of burden shifting that requires an employer to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the same adverse action would have been
taken in the absence of protected activity. 72 Attorneys practicing in this
area should be aware that the Federal Circuit applies that Act in an
idiosyncratic way that strips a federal employee of protection if the

68. Pub. L. No. 101-12, § 3(a)(13), 103 Stat. 29 (1989) (codified as amended 5
U.S.C.A. § 1221 (West 1994)).
69. § 122(e)(1).
70. § 1221(e)(1)(A-B).
71. § 1221(e)(2). See also Kewley v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 153 F.3d
1357 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
72. This is discussed further in the mixed motive section. See infra notes 24261 and accompanying text.
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otherwise protected internal complaint is made to the supervisor or
manager responsible for the violation of law. 73 This error has been
confined 74
to applications of the federal Whistleblower Protection Act,

however.

2. The Banking-Related Acts
Whistleblower provisions of the Financial Institutions Reform,
Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 protect employees of
depository institutions and federal banks from discrimination when they
report certain conduct to a regulatory agency, bank, or the Attorney
General. 75 These whistleblowers may sue in a United States district
court without exhausting any administrative remedies.76
The Federal Credit Union Act similarly forbids insured credit
unions to discharge or otherwise discriminate against employees who
inform a government body about possible violations of law by credit
unions or by their directors, officers, or employees.7 7 Unlike the
banking act and the Department's whistleblower statutes, wholly
internal disclosures or complaints by credit union employees receive no
protection. The language of this act assigns no burdens of proof to the
parties, but the courts have incorporated the familiar ones that apply in
cases under the 1989 banking act.78 The USA Patriot Act forbids
73. See, e.g., Willis v. Dep't of Agric., 141 F.3d 1139, 1143 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
and Horton v. Dep't of Navy, 66 F.3d 279, 282 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
74. See, e.g., Hooven-Lewis v. Caldera, 249 F.3d 259, 276 (4th Cir. 2001)
(following the Federal Circuit's decisions).
For a fuller discussion of
whistleblower protections for federal workers, see THOMAS M. DEVINE, The
Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989: Foundation for the Modern Law of
Employment Dissent, 51 ADMIN. L. REv. 531 (1999).
75.12 U.S.C. § 1831j (2001).
76. Id.; see generally Gregory G. Samo, Liability, under National Banking Act 12
U.S.C.A. § 93, of National Bank Directors for Retaliation Against Officer or
Employee who Discloses or Refuses to Commit Banking Irregularity. 101 A.L.R. FED

377 (1991).
77. 12 U.S.C. § 1790b(a)(1) (2001). See also Garrett v. Langley Fed. Credit
Union, 121 F. Supp. 2d 887 (E.D. Va. 2000) (denying a credit union's motion for
summary judgment where a jury could infer that the credit union retaliated against
the employees after they reported to examiners their concerns about certain
business practices).
78. § 183 1j; see also Simas v. First Citizens' Fed. Credit Union, 170 F.3d 37, 44
(1st Cir. 1999).
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financial or other institutions to discharge or otherwise discriminate
against any employees who provide information to the Secretary of the
Treasury, the Attorney General, or any Federal supervisory agency
about possible violations of that Act, its regulations, or of specific
statutes targeting money laundering and transactions by unlicensed
money transmitting businesses.7 9

III. ESSENTIAL CONCEPTS
A. Intent is Everything
Whistleblower protection matters are disparate treatment claims.
They focus on whether the employer intentionally discriminated or
retaliated against the employee on the basis of a protected characteristic
(for Title VII plaintiffs) or a protected activity (for whistleblowers or
union organizers and members).
1. Direct proof of discrimination
a) Availability
Direct proof of discriminatory intent is rarely available. "There will
seldom be 'eyewitness' testimony as to the employer's mental
processes." 80 The Fifth Circuit's remarks in a case under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 196781 (ADEA) is equally
applicable to DOL whistleblower protection claims:
Unless the employer is a latter-day George
Washington, employment discrimination is as difficult
to prove as who chopped down the cherry tree . . .
Employers are rarely so cooperative as to include a
notation in the personnel file, "fired due to age," or to
inform a dismissed employee candidly that he is too
old for the job.82

79. 31 U.S.C. § 5328 (2003).
80. U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983).
81. 81 Stat. 602 (1967), amended by 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1999).
82. Thornbrough v. Columbus & Greenville RR. Co., 760 F.2d 633, 638 (5th

Cir. 1985) (citations omitted).
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Sometimes an employer's statements or actions lay its intentions
bare.
1. A trucking company manager might thunder to a driver: "I'm
sick and tired of your bellyaching about safety, you are #$%^*@#
fired."
2. Setting aside applications from women without review
because the men who constitute the review committee know their
boss would never hire a female investigator is direct proof of sex
discrimination in violation of Title VII. 3
3. Another example is an employer's declaration to a Hispanic
female disc jockey that she would be denied an advantage (a84better time
slot for her radio show) because she was not "a black male."
4. A landlord's comment that she does not want couples with
children living in her apartment building because they may disturb
other elderly tenants is direct evidence of familial status discrimination
85
forbidden by the Fair Housing Act.
5. A supervisor's repeated reminders to an employee that he or she
can be replaced by someone younger and cheaper are direct evidence of
86
age discrimination.
6. A corporate officer's remarks during a general meeting with
employees of a newly acquired company that older workers "have
problems adapting to changes and new policies" is direct evidence of
87
age discrimination.
"Smoking gun" instances of direct evidence collected from the
Eleventh Circuit in Merritt v. DillardPaper Company88 illustrate how
unsophisticated employers have gotten themselves into hot water with
embarrassingly blunt statements of discriminatory animus. 89 The
treatise Employment DiscriminationLaw cites decisions expressing the
classic, dictionary view that "direct" evidence is proof that requires the
83. Lewis v. Smith, 731 F.2d 1535 (11 th Cir. 1984).
84. Mojica v. Gannett Co., Inc., 7 F.3d 552, 561 (7th Cir. 1993) (en banc).
85. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a); Kormoczy v. Sec'y of Dep't of H.U.D., 53 F.3d 821
(7th Cir. 1995).
86. Rose v. N.Y. City Bd. of Educ., 257 F.3d 156 (2d Cir. 2001).
87. Beshears v. Asbill, 930 F.2d 1348,1354 (8th Cir. 1991).
88. Merritt v. Dillard Paper Co., 120 F.3d 1181, 1189-90 (11 th Cir. 1997).
89. See also the discriminatory statements collected at Lindeman and Grossman,
supra note 60, at 55-56, n. 113 for additional examples.
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trier of fact to draw no inferences.9 ° That widespread view is flawed
for the reasons the Second Circuit gave in Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel and
explained by Judge Tjoflat in Wright v. Southland Corporation. These
cases will be discussed in the following section.
b) Direct proof: Can you know it when you hear it?
The observation that "the various circuits have about as many
definitions of 'direct evidence' as they do employment discrimination
cases" remains as apt as when it was first made in Tyler v. Bethlehem
Steel Corporation.9' It is essential to review the holdings on what has
qualified as "direct" evidence of invidious discrimination in the federal
circuit in which a case arises.
A trio of court of appeals decisions reviews the law in this area
well: Wright v. Southland Corporation;92 Fernandes v. Costa Bros.
Masonry, Inc.;93 and Costa v. Desert Palace, Incorporated.94 Wright
and Fernandes are not binding precedents,95 but they provide valuable
orientations to the case law that deals with direct proof.
In Wright, Judge Tjoflat, reversing a summary judgment for an
employer in a case alleging both age discrimination and a retaliatory
termination for filing an EEOC complaint, painstakingly explained why
"direct" evidence must encompass inferences. 96 He concluded, much
as the Second Circuit had in Tyler,97 that direct evidence means proof
from which a trier of fact could conclude, more probably than not, that
90. Id. at 56 n. 116 (Cumulative Supp. 2002).
91.

Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 1176, 1183 (2nd Cir. 1992)

(holding in a Title VII case that "direct" evidence simply means proof sufficient for
the fact finder to conclude that an illegitimate characteristic was a motivating factor
for the challenged action).
92. Wright v. Southland Corp., 187 F.3d 1287 (1 1th Cir. 1999).
93. Fernandes v. Costa Bros. Masonry, Inc., 199 F.3d 572, 582-83 (1st Cir.
1999), abrogatedby Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003).

94. Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) affid
sub nom. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
95. Wright is the opinion of a single judge. The Supreme Court abrogated the
Fernandes holding without diminishing the utility of the classification system it
presented for the approaches appellate courts use to identify direct evidence of
discriminatory animus.
96. Wright, 187 F.3d at 1289.
97. Tyler, 958 F.2d at 1183.
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a protected characteristic (age) or activity (filing a discrimination
98
complaint) contributed to the contested employment decision.
Although he failed to persuade the two other members of the panel,
who concurred only in the result, the Ninth Circuit accepted his
reasoning in its en bane decision in Costa v. Desert Palace,
Incorporated.99
The First Circuit divided the patchwork of decisions that have
attempted to describe "direct" evidence of discrimination into three
schools of thought or approaches. 100 While the Supreme Court
specifically abrogated that court's holding in Desert Palace, Inc. v.
Costa, the three categories the First Circuit fashioned aid in making
sense of what otherwise seems chaotic.' 0 ' Individual circuits do not
follow those categories reliably, however, which limits their utility.'0 2
The Ninth Circuit canvassed the law on "direct" evidence in its
decision in Costa v. DesertPalace,Inc., but determined that it need not
choose any approach. 103 It held that direct proof of discrimination is
unnecessary for a plaintiff to obtain a mixed-motive jury instruction
under the 1991 amendments to Title VII. The Supreme Court agreed.
It similarly sidestepped the issue of what direct evidence is, even
though it had granted certiorari in part to consider the distinction
between what constituted direct and circumstantial evidence of
retaliation.10 4 That distinction retains vitality because complainants

98. Wright, 187 F.3d at 1293-1306.
99. Costa, 299 F.3d at 853. For additionally discussion on this case, see supra
notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
100. These are the "classic" position (the evidence is self-sufficient to show
discriminatory animus), the "animus plus" position (the evidence of animus must
bear squarely on the adverse employment action the plaintiff complains about), and
the "animus" position (the evidence of discrimination needs no tie to the adverse
employment action). Fernandes, 199 F.3d at 582-83 (finding the plaintiffs
evidence too ambiguous to qualify as direct evidence).
101. DesertPalace,Inc., 539 U.S. at 90.
102. The Ninth Circuit later despaired of harmonizing the case law dealing
with what qualifies as "direct" evidence of discrimination even within individual
circuits, let alone among them. It characterized the state of the law as a hopelessly
incoherent "morass" and "quagmire." Costa, 299 F.3d at 853-54.
103. Id. at 838. The Ninth Circuit believed the First Circuit had misclassified
its approach to direct evidence in the Fernandes decision as that of an "animus
plus" jurisdiction. Id. at 853 n.3.
104. Desert Palace,Inc., 539 U.S. at 101 n.3.
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Douglas
who present direct proof do not depend on the McDonnell
1 05
evidence.
their
of
presentation
the
in
burden shifting
Decisions frequently contrast direct evidence to circumstantial
proof. For example, in a Title VII retaliatory firing claim, the Seventh
Circuit described direct proof as "evidence that establishes without
resort to inferences from circumstantial evidence" that the plaintiff
engaged in a protected activity (filing a discrimination charge) and, as a
As it reversed an employer's summary
result, was terminated. 10 6
judgment in an age discrimination case, the Eleventh Circuit fell back
on a similar dictionary definition to say that "[d]irect evidence is
'[e]vidence, which if believed, proves the existence of the fact in issue
without inference or presumption."" 7 These formulations disregard
two salient facts. All knowledge is inferential, as the decision in Visser
v. PackerEngineeringAssociates, Inc. points out.1" 8 Second, inductive
legal reasoning is by its nature inferential. 0 9 It moves from the
particular (the facts a party proves) to a legal conclusion (liability or
exoneration for intentional discrimination) that is only probable, not
mathematically certain. Ultimately, however, it is unhelpful to contrast
direct evidence with some other type of proof that requires the fact
finder to take no inferential steps before the key fact (discriminatory
intent) is considered to be proven. Only an employer's admission
establishes discriminatory intent without resort to inferences of any
kind." 0
Such evidence is not needed for a plaintiff to successfully
prove intentional discrimination."' Neither should it be required to
qualify as direct evidence.' 12 Following its 2002 en banc decision in
Desert Palace,the Ninth Circuit stated that direct evidence "typically
consists of clearly sexist, racist, or similarly discriminatory statements

105. See supra notes 140-146 and accompanying text.
106. Stone v. City of Indianapolis Pub. Utils. Div., 281 F.3d 640, 643 (7th Cir.
2002).
107. Rollins v. Techsouth, Inc., 833 F.2d 1525, 1528 n.6 (11th Cir. 1987)
(quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 413 (5th ed. 1979)).
108. Visser v. Packer Eng'g Assocs., Inc., 924 F.2d 655, 659 (7th Cir. 1991)
(en banc).
109. RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, LOGIC FOR LAWYERS, A GUIDE TO CLEAR LEGAL
THINKING, Ch. 6 (NITA3rd ed. 1997).
110. Wright, 187 F.3d at 1295 n.9.
111. DesertPalace,Inc., 539 U.S. at 90.
112. Tyler, 958 F.2d at 1185.
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or actions by the employer.""' 3 But just how clear must that evidence
be? The court went on to say that, when the objectionable comment
was not directed to the plaintiff, some inference is needed to connect
the discrimination to the plaintiff. When the evidence shows animus to
a class the plaintiff belongs to (such as a reference to "dumb Mexicans"
when the plaintiff is Mexican) "the inference to the fact of
is sufficiently small that we have
discrimination against the plaintiff
' "14
direct."
as
evidence
the
treated
The Eight Circuit may have abandoned the direct/circumstantial
dichotomy altogether in employment discrimination cases. Consider its
analysis in Griffith v. City of Des Moines:
We have long recognized and followed this principle
in applying McDonnell Douglas by holding that a
plaintiff may survive the defendant's motion for
summary judgment in one of two ways. The first is by
proof of "direct evidence" of discrimination. Direct
evidence in this context is not the converse of
circumstantial evidence, as many seem to assume.
Rather, direct evidence is evidence "showing a
specific link between the alleged discriminatory
animus and the challenged decision, sufficient to
support a finding by a reasonable fact finder that an
illegitimate criterion actually motivated" the adverse
employment action. Thus, "direct" refers to the causal
strength of the proof, not whether it is 'circumstantial'
evidence. A plaintiff with strong (direct) evidence
that illegal discrimination motivated the employer's
adverse action does not need the three-part McDonnell
Douglas analysis to get to the jury, regardless of
whether his strong evidence is circumstantial. But if
the plaintiff lacks evidence that clearly points to the
presence of an illegal motive, he must avoid summary
113. Coghlan v. Am. Seafoods Co., LLC, 413 F.3d 1090, 1095 (9th Cir. 2005)
(affirming summary judgment against a plaintiff who had alleged job
discrimination because he was not Norwegian, without offering direct evidence of
discrimination).
114. Id. at 1095 n.6 (relying on Cordova v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 124 F.3d
1145, 1149 (9th Cir. 1997)).
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judgment by creating the requisite inference of
unlawful discrimination through the McDonnell
Douglas analysis, including sufficient evidence of
5
pretext. 1
In a Title VII sex discrimination claim for refusal to promote and
for constructive discharge, the Fourth Circuit stated that direct evidence
is proof of conduct or statements that both reflects discriminatory
animus and bears directly on the contested employment action." 6 It
also has been characterized as is proof that "can be interpreted as an
acknowledgment of discriminatory intent by the defendant or its
agents."' 17
Treating statements or acts that point toward a discriminatory
motive for the adverse employment action as direct evidence is the
most practical approach.
Oblique or ambiguous statements that require context to appreciate
have qualified as direct evidence. The following serve as examples of
such:
1. An officer-employee of a savings and loan association was
ousted after bringing irregularities to the attention of regulators.
Before she suffered any adverse actions, the association's president
wrote to criticize her disclosures and to make a record of her actions
that would serve as "the basis from which future management

115. Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 736 (8th Cir. 2004)
(referring to McDonnell, 411 U.S. at 792) (citing Thomas v. First Nat'l Bank of
Wynne, 11 F.3d 64, 66 (8th Cir. 1997)).
116. Rowland v. Am. Gen. Fin., 340 F.3d 187, 192 (4th Cir. 2003).
117. Troupe v. May Dept. Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 1994). In this
case, the plaintiff sued to challenge her termination one day before she would have
gone on pregnancy leave. On a defense motion for summary judgment, the trial
judge treated a statement by the plaintiff's immediate supervisor that she did not
believe the plaintiff would return to work after giving birth as insufficient to
qualify as direct evidence of discriminatory intent. The appellate court regarded
that statement as circumstantial evidence of motivation, but held that firing plaintiff
in the belief she would not return did not violate the Pregnancy Discrimination Act,
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(k) (West 1991).
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decisions will be made. ' 118 This ominous but vague letter was found
9
to be direct evidence of discriminatory animus."
2. In an age discrimination case the court of appeals considered
the statement: "[T]hink of it like this. In a forest you have to cut
down the old, big trees so that the little trees underneath can
grow.' 20 This was no stray remark. The manager who fired the
plaintiff offered it in a conversation not long after the termination to
explain the firing.
It also qualified as direct evidence of
discrimination.121
On the other hand, direct evidence at times has been defined in the
negative, that "stray remarks in the workplace," "statements by
nondecision makers" or "statements by decision makers unrelated to
the decisional process itself' do not constitute direct evidence. 122 A
summary judgment for the employer was affirmed in Yates v. Douglas.
There, supervisor X had used the "n" word to refer to the AfricanAmerican employee and made other offensive comments one to two
years before discharge.' 23 The allegedly biased supervisor was found
not to have played an integral role in the termination.
[E]ven were we to find that [the allegedly bigoted
supervisor] was closely involved in the employment
decision, we would nevertheless affirm .... Not all
comments that may reflect a discriminatory attitude
are sufficiently related to the adverse employment
action in question to support an inference of racial
discrimination . . . . Direct evidence of racial
discrimination is not established by mere stray

118. Frobose v. Am. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Danville, 152 F.3d 602, 607 (7th
Cir. 1998) (reversing a summary judgment for the association in an action under
the banking whistleblower statute, § 183 lj(a)).
119. Id.
120. Wichmann v. Bd. of Trs. of S. 11. Univ., 180 F.3d 791, 795 (7th
Cir. 1999), vacatedand remanded on othergrounds, 528 U.S. 1111 (2000).
121. Id.
122. Beshears v. Asbill, 930 F.2d 1348,1354 (8th Cir. 1991) (adopting
language from Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion that was part of the badly
fractured 4-1-1 majority in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 277 (1989)
(plurality opinion)).
123. Yates v. Douglas, 255 F.3d 546 (8th Cir. 2001).
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remarks in the workplace, statements by non-decision
makers, or statements by decision-makers unrelated
24
to the decisional process itself.1
In Tracanna v. Arctic Slope Inspection Service, the complainant
presented testimony at trial of his immediate supervisor's boasts that
only he had what it took to get rid of the complainant. For this and
other reasons the judge found against the employer.' 25 The Board
questioned whether there was credible proof that the supervisor made
the statement, but ascribed little significance to it if it had been made.
The statement came after the layoff, and the supervisor had pressed
his own superiors to offer the complainant another position.
Moreover, the boastful immediate supervisor was neither responsible
for laying the complainant off nor for making decisions about
whether to offer him other positions; rather, higher supervisors were.
If the remark had been made, "it would not be legally significant in
connection with [the complainant's] layoff and subsequent job
offers,
126
which were determined by higher-level [ASIS] personnel."'
c) Applying the Definitions of Direct Evidence
The First Circuit found that the president of a credit union had
made surprisingly direct and express threats of retaliation in a
memorandum to the plaintiff in Simas v. First Citizens' FederalCredit
Union.' 27
The vice president responsible for delinquent loan
collections told the internal auditor that he might have to inform federal
regulators of her failure to investigate a troubled, unusually large loan
the president had orchestrated for a friend who also served on the credit
union's board of directors. The internal auditor complained to the
president about this pressure to investigate. The president wrote a
memorandum to the collections' vice president instructing him that that
he would be terminated immediately if he brought up these
"unwarranted charges or threats" again. 28 His concerns were hardly
124. Id. at 549 (internal quotations omitted).
125. Tracanna v. Arctic Slope Inspection Serv., ARB No. 1998-168, ALJ No.
1997-WPC-1 (ARB July 31, 2001).
126. Id. at 11 (citation omitted).
127. Simas, 170 F.3d at 37.
128. Id. at 42.
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unwarranted; when the borrower defaulted, the commercial property
securing the loan proved much less valuable than the balance due.
After the vice president notified federal authorities of the loss, as the
law required, he suffered many reprisals and essentially was forced out
of his job within five months. The appellate court found the president's
memorandum was direct evidence of discriminatory 29animus that
precluded summary judgment in the credit union's favor.'
The court in Ezell v. Potter reversed a summary judgment motion
granted in favor of the U.S. Postal Service on claims of disparate
treatment grounded in both Title VII (for race and sex discrimination)
and the ADEA. 130 The plaintiff mail carrier offered direct evidence of
discrimination through anti-white, anti-male, and anti-older worker
remarks his co-supervisors uttered. That appellate panel described
direct evidence as "evidence that can be interpreted as an
To
acknowledgment of the defendant's discriminatory intent.
constitute direct evidence of discrimination, a statement must relate to
the motivation of the decision-maker responsible for the contested
decision."''
One of plaintiffs two supervisors said they planned "to
get rid of older carriers and replace them with younger, faster
carriers."' 13 2 The other frequently made disparaging remarks about
older workers, and referred often to plaintiffs "gray hair and beard,
commented on his slowness and suggested that because of his speed, he
should consider another line of work."' 33 This qualified as direct proof
of discriminatory animus aimed at the plaintiff that exposed that
supervisor's age bias. The two supervisors recommended that the
postmaster, the ultimate decision-maker, terminate the plaintiff, and
provided supporting information. Their discriminatory motives were
imputed to the postmaster when he did so.
A supervisor's disapproval of an employee's report to a
government agency can be important evidence of intentional
discrimination. A supervisor's comment that the complainant used the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission as a threat "virtually amounts to direct

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. at 48.
Ezell, 400 F.3d at 1051.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
Id.
Id.
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evidence of discrimination."' 34 A manager's similar testimony that he
thought the complainant "is using OSHA" by complaining
constituted
"very strong evidence of discriminatory intent."' 35
2. Circumstantial evidence of retaliation
Evidence of invidious retaliation is often circumstantial.
Circumstantial evidence is not inferior proof. "[I]n any lawsuit, the
' 36
plaintiff may prove his case by direct or circumstantial evidence."'
The law does not distinguish between the weight given to direct or
circumstantial evidence. 137 The inference of discriminatory intent is
reached inductively, from the evidence as a whole.' 38 The difficulty in
obtaining evidence that plainly suggests discrimination spawned the
ubiquitous McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework that "is
designed to give the plaintiff a boost when he has no actual evidence of
discrimination 39(or retaliation) but just some suspicious
circumstances."'

134. Blake v. Hatfield Elec. Co., Case No. 1987-ERA-4 (Sec'y Dec. and
Remand Ord. Jan. 22, 1992).
135. Fabricius v. Town of Braintree Park Dept., ARB No. 1997-144, OALJ
Case No. 1997-14, slip op. at 7 (ARB Feb. 9, 1999).
136. Aikens, 460 U.S. at 714 n. 3.
137. Desert Palace, Inc., 539 U.S. at 100 (2003) (relying on A K. O'MALLEY,
ET AL, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS, CRIMINAL §12.04 (5th ed.
2000); L. SAND, J. SIFFERT ET AL, MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 74.01

(2002) (model instruction 74-2)). See also EDWARD J. DEVITT & CHARLES B.

15.02, at 441-442 (3d
ed. 1977) (quoted in Tyler, 958 F.2d at 1184); the model instructions in the United
States Court of Appeals, Fifth Judicial Circuit, Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil
Cases
§
2.18
(2004)
at
http://www.lb5.uscourts.gov/juryinstructions/2004CIVIL.htm;
and the Ninth
Circuit's Manual of Model Civil Jury Instructions § 1.6 (2004) found at
http://www.ce9.uscourts.gov/web/sdocuments.nsf/civ).
138. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000)
(analyzing evidence in this fashion where the employee had challenged his
termination under the ADEA). See also Seater v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., ARB
Nos. 1996-013 & 1997-072, OALJ Case No. 1995-ERA-13, slip op. at 5-6 (ARB
Sept. 27, 1996).
139. Stone, 281 F.3d at 643. See also Wright, 187 F.3d at 1301 (remarking
that the presumption was added to make the plaintiff's task slightly easier).
BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS, §
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There are at least three types of circumstantial evidence of
intentional discrimination:
1. Suspicious timing, ambiguous statements (oral or written),
behavior or comments directed at other members of the protected
group, and other bits and pieces from which the ultimate inference of
discriminatory intent might be drawn;
2. Proof that employees who are situated similarly to the plaintiff,
but who lack a characteristic on which an employer is forbidden to base
a difference in treatment (e.g., race, gender, age, pregnancy, etc.),
received systematically better treatment. That proof may or may not be
rigorously statistical;
3. Proof that the plaintiff was qualified for the job in question but
passed over in favor of (or replaced by) a person who lacked the
protected characteristic.
3. Burden of Proof
A complainant may prove retaliation for a protected activity with
direct or circumstantial evidence.
a) Direct Proof of Discrimination
A plaintiff who relies on direct proof of discrimination shoulders
the ordinary burden to establish the claim by a preponderance of the
evidence. The employer has no affirmative burden to prove anything in
response, but almost certainly will deny that the discriminatory
statements were made or acts occurred.
b) Circumstantial Proof of Discrimination
A plaintiff who relies on circumstantial evidence of invidious
discrimination must successfully navigate the course of shifting
burdens the U.S. Supreme Court first articulated in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, and was progressively refined in various subsequent
cases. 140 The elements of a prima facie case of discrimination serve a

140. McDonnell, 411 U.S. at 792. As noted, the holding of McDonnell was
refined in various subsequent cases, including Tex. Dep't. of Comm. Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502
(1993); and Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000). See
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gate-keeping function: they set the minimum proof required for a
plaintiff to keep a foot inside the courtroom door. The employer
responds by articulating (not proving) one or more legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its adverse action. This bursts the bubble of
the presumption that arises from plaintiffs prima facie case. The
plaintiff then shows that the reason offered was not the true reason for
the adverse action, but rather a pretext to mask invidious
discrimination."'4 Concessions by the employer's witnesses during their
cross-examination in depositions or at trial may suffice to prove pretext
by exposing that the reasons the employer offers for its adverse actions
as so weak, implausible, inconsistent, incoherent or contradictory that
The plaintiff often needs to offer
they are unworthy of belief.
additional evidence to show that this reason is merely pretextual. No
universal rule controls this highly fact-sensitive issue. The ultimate
burden of proof on the issue of discriminatory intent always remains
with the plaintiff, just as it does in a claim based on direct evidence.
4. Allocation of BOP Does not Dictate the Order of Proof
The three-part McDonnell Douglas framework is not applicable
when the complainant offers direct proof of discrimination; those are
straightforward "she said, he said" cases. 142 Claims predicated on
circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent rarely proceed in three
neat phases. The parties' positions become known through discovery,
so the plaintiff will likely cover the elements of discrimination and
evidence about pretext during the case-in-chief. The McDonnell
Douglas framework, as modified by Burdine, was "never intended to
be rigid, mechanized or ritualistic. Rather, it is merely a sensible,
experience as
orderly way to evaluate the evidence in light of common
143
it bears on the critical question of discrimination."'
Poll v. R.J. Vyhnalek Trucking, ARB No. 99-110, ALJ No. 96-STA-35, slip op. at
5-6 (ARB June 28, 2002).
141. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 502.
142. See Kormoczy v. Sec'y of Dep't of H.U.D., 53 F.3d 821, 824 (7th Cir.
1995) (recognizing that the direct approach and the McDonnell burden shifting are
"distinct evidentiary paths."). See also Griffith, 387 F.3d at 736; Wright, 187 F.3d
at 1294, 1297, and 1301; Lowe v. City of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998, 1006 (9th Cir.
1985) ("[A] plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment without
satisfying the McDonnell Douglas test.").
143. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).
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B. The Complainant'sPrima Facie Case
The complainant must adduce some evidence on each element of
the whistleblower discrimination claim.'" The rule is not relaxed for
unrepresented complainants. 145 In Smith v. Sysco Foods of Baltimore,
a truck driver was fired under his employer's policy of assessing
penalty points to those who arrived late to work. He offered no proof
that he filed a complaint related to vehicle safety or that he refused to
operate a vehicle. The judge's recommended order dismissed the claim
for failure to prove that he had engaged in protected activity, an
essential element of a prima facie case. The Board affirmed, noting
that although the complainant was a pro se litigant, "the burden of first
establishing, and ultimately proving, the necessary elements of a
whistleblower claim is no less for pro se litigants than it is for litigants
represented by counsel."' 14 6

The four essential elements of all

whistleblower discrimination claims are not especially onerous. As
will be discussed, these elements are: (1) status; (2) engaging in a
protected activity; (3) adverse action; and (4) a causal connection.
1.Status
The complainant must be an employee covered by a relevant
statute. Complaints must be filed with the Department of Labor within
the time the statute prescribes. Strictly speaking, the timeliness of the
complaint is not an element of the claim, but an affirmative defense the
employer can raise. OSHA often dismisses a complaint when the
investigation shows that it was filed too late.
For ERA cases the time to file with the Department is 180 days
from the date of the adverse action, as it is for cases under the STAA
and the Pipeline Safety Act. 147 For AIR 21 and SOX cases the period is

144. Regan v. Nat'l Welders Supply, ARB No. 03-117, AU No. 03-STA-14,
slip op. at 5-6 (ARB Sept. 30, 2004).
145. Smith v. Sysco Foods, ARB No. 03-134, AU No. 2003-STA-32 slip op
at 4 (ARB Oct. 19, 2004).
146. Id..
147. § 5851(b)(1) (ERA); § 31105(b)(1) (STAA); 60129(b)(1) (Pipeline
Safety).
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ninety days. 4 8 Under the environmental statutes the period is much
shorter - thirty days. 149 The clock runs from the time the employee
becomes aware or reasonably should be aware of the employer's
adverse action."' In narrow circumstances, the time limits may be
subject to equitable tolling.
For example, in Tennessee Valley
Authority v. United States Secretary of Labor, the court of appeals
affirmed an earlier decision that modified the ERA limitations period
equitable grounds when the employer had concealed an operative fact
that formed the basis of the claim.' 5 '
2. Protected Activity
It is not unlawful for an employer to be a jerk. Shabby or even
reprehensible treatment of an employee violates no employment
discrimination statute. To obtain relief the employee must prove that a
protected activity (such as whistle blowing under one of the
Department of Labor's statutes or union activity under the NLRA) or a
protected characteristic (such as race or sex under Title VII or age
under the ADEA) motivated the abuse. The majority's reasoning in
Visser, an age discrimination matter, illustrates this point particularly
15 2
well.
Not every disclosure of corporate wrongdoing earns an employee
whistleblower protection.
The complainant must have disclosed
something a Department of Labor statute protects. The following
demonstrate the importance of specifically linking the activity with
protections afforded under a statute:

148. § 42121(b)(1) (AIR 21); § 1514A(b)(2)(A) (SOX).
149. See, e.g., § 300j-9(i)(2)(A) (Safe Drinking Water Act); § 7622(b)(1)
(Clean Air Act).
150. Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258 (1980); Howard v. Tenn.
Valley Auth., 1990-ERA-24 (Sec'y July 3, 1991).
151. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Sec'y of Labor, 2003 WL 932433 (6th Cir. 2003)
(unpublished), aff'g Overall v. Tenn. Valley Auth., ARB Nos. 98-111, 98-128, ALJ
No. 1997-ERA-53 (2001).
152. Visser, 924 F.2d at 660. See also Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs.
Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 70-81 (1989) (commenting that Title VII and, by implication,
other anti-discrimination statutes did not establish a "general civility code for the
American workplace.").
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1. The Secretary of Labor cannot grant relief for discrimination of
the types prohibited by Title VII, or the NLRA. 5 3 A whistleblower act
may be broadly interpreted, however. Safety complaints that are not
obviously related to nuclear safety can be protected under the ERA
because employment retaliation "may directly affect the radiological
safety of nuclear plant construction and operation."' 54 For example, in
Stephenson v. NASA, the court held that emissions of ethylene oxide
and freon in an enclosed space within the space shuttle made out a
Clean Air Act complaint, even though at first blush it appears to be an
occupational hazard under § 11(c) of the OSHA Act rather than an
environmental hazard).' 55
SOX presupposes that the matter disclosed will include some
intentionally deceitful acts by the employer or some fraud against
shareholders or investors.
2. A manufacturer's poor internal quality control does not equate
to securities fraud. 156 A trial judge rejected as insufficient allegations
that the employee had been terminated for his complaints that a
significant number of auto and marine batteries the publicly traded
corporation manufactured were being returned as defective. He
raised no securities fraud. A Senate Report accompanying the SOX
Act explained that the statute "would provide whistleblower
protection to employees of publicly traded companies who report acts
of fraud to federal officials with the authority to remedy the
wrongdoing or to supervisors or appropriate individuals within their
company. ' 77 The law was designed to protect employees "in
detecting and stopping actions which they reasonably believe are
Securities fraud may include "any means of
fraudulent."' 58
153. Wilkinson v. Tex. Utils., 1992-ERA-16 (Sec'y July 13, 1993) (sex
discrimination complaint properly dismissed); Varnadore v. Oak Ridge Nat'l. Lab.,
1992-CAA-2 and 5, 1993-CAA-1 and 1994-CAA-2 and 3 (ARB June 14, 1996)
(alleged unethical act by an employee in the department's appellate office
consisting of offering advice to a litigant was not actionable).
154. Van Beck v. Daniel Constr. Co., 1986-ERA-26 (Sec'y Aug. 3, 1993);
Stephenson v. NASA, 1994-TSC-5 (Sec'y July 3, 1995).
155. Stephenson, 1994-TSC-5 (Sec'y July 3, 1995).
156. See, e.g., Ames Dep't Stores Inc., Stock Litigation, 991 F.2d 953, 967 (2d
Cir. 1993) (addressing SEC antifraud regulations), Tuttle v. Johnson Controls
Battery Division, 2004-SOX-76 slip op. at 3-4 (ALJ Jan. 3, 2005).
157. S. Rep. No. 107-146, 2002 WL 863249 (May 6, 2002)
158. Id.
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disseminating false information into the market on which a
59
reasonable investor would rely."'
3. An allegation that an employer illegally released sludge into
groundwater, when the release neither constituted nor led to a fraud
on shareholders, failed to state a claim under that act. 160 The same
was true when a medical transcriber could not identify how her
complaints that she had been underpaid "provided information about
conduct she reasonably believed constituted a violation of the federal
fraud statutes, or an SEC rule or regulation, or any other federal law
relating to shareholder fraud."' 16 ' A complaint about indoor air
quality that may have been adequate under § 1 l(c) of the OSHA Act
failed to state a claim for protection under the SOX statute when it
implicated no shareholder fraud. 162 Minkina v. Affiliated Physicians
Group, 2005-SOX-19 (ALJ Feb. 22, 2005) (also holding the
employer was not a publicly traded company covered by the SOX
statute).
4. In Fader v. Transportation Security Administration, a
complaint under the AIR 21 alleged only that the complainant had
reported violations of the Privacy Act, abuses of the junior
workforce, nepotism and fraud. 163 The trial judge granted the
employer's motion to dismiss for failure to state claim upon which
relief could be granted, holding that a protected activity under AIR
21 must specifically implicate safety.
a) Intra-corporate Disclosures are Protected
Protection now extends to an employee's intra-corporate safety,
quality control or other complaints or disclosures. 164 The Fifth Circuit
159. Ames Dep't. Store, Inc., 991 F.2d at 953, Tuttle, 2004-SOX-76 slip op. at

3-4.
160. Hopkins v. ATK Tactical Sys., 2004-SOX-19 (ALJMay 27, 2004).

161. Reddy v. Medquist, Inc., ARB No. 04-123, ALJ No. 2004-SOX-35 (ARB

Sept. 30, 2005).
162. Minkina v. Affiliated Physicians Group, 2005-SOX-19 (ALJ Feb. 22,
2005) (also holding the employer was not a publicly traded company covered by
the SOX statute).
163. Fader v. Transp. Sec. Admin., 2004-AIR-27 (ALJ June 17, 2004).

164. § 5851(a)(1(A) (part of the amendments to the ERA made in the Energy
Policy Act of 1992); H.R. No. 102-474 (VIII) at 78, as reprinted in 1992
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1953, 2282, 2296 (demonstrating that Congress had always intended
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now recognizes that its contrary holding in the early cases of Brown &
Root, Inc. v. Donovan,16 5 and Willy v. Coastal Corporation,166 were

overturned by Congress in the 1992 ERA amendments.' 67 This
protection of internal complaints is a crucial aspect of the statutes. All
three whistleblowers selected as Time's 2002 People of the Year made
their complaints internally. Accountant Sherron Watkins wrote her
complaint to the top executive of her company, Enron CEO Ken Lay.
Internal auditor Cynthia Cooper went to WorldCom's controller and to
the chief financial officer; when they were unresponsive, she went over
their heads to the chairman of the board's audit committee and the
outside auditor KPMG.168 FBI Special Agent Coleen Rowley wrote to
FBI Director Robert Mueller.
b) Employer Cannot Require Internal Report Before Employee
Reports to Government.
An employee cannot be required to complain internally before
blowing the whistle to outside regulators, or disciplined for failing to
follow an established chain of command when making internal
69
complaints.'

to protect employees who notify their employer of an alleged violation as well as
those who notify a federal regulator). See also Stone, 115 F.3d at 1576; Passaic
Valley Sewerage Comm'r v. Dep't of Labor, 992 F.2d 474 (3rd Cir. 1993); Kan.
Gas & Elec. Co. v. Brock, 780 F.2d 1505 (10th Cir. 1985); Mackowiak v. Univ.
Nuclear Sys., Inc., 735 F.2d 1159, 1163 (9th Cir. 1984)
165. Brown & Root, Inc. v. Donovan 747 F.2d 1029 (5th Cir. 1984)
166. Willy v. Coastal Corp. 855 F.2d 1160, 1169 n.13 (5th Cir. 1988).
167. Willy v. Admin. Review Bd., 423 F.3d 483 (5th Cir. 2005), affig Willy v.
Admin. Review Bd., ARB No. 97-107, ALJ Case No. 1985-CAA-1 ("Congress
clarified by statute [i.e., the 1992 amendments to the ERA] that Brown & Root was
incorrect in holding that complaints to employers were not protected under § 5851).
Id. at 489 n. 9.
168. Geoffrey Colvin, Wonder Women of Whistleblowing, FORTUNE, Aug. 12,
2002,
available
at
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortunearchive/2002/08/12/327047/inde
x.htm.
169. Williams v. Mason & Hanger Corp, ARB No. 98-030, ALJ No. 1997ERA-14, slip op. at 10 (ARB Nov. 13, 2002); Fabricius, 1997-CAA-14, slip op. at
4 (ARB Feb. 9, 1999). See also Pogue v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 940 F.2d 1287,
1290 (9th Cir. 1991) (upholding a finding that a "chain of command" defense was
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c) Employee's Motive for Reporting to Government is Irrelevant
to Protection.
Congress demands no altruistic motivation from whistleblowers.
Even an employee with smoldering hostility toward the employer, who
gleefully reports something that causes the employer grief with a
regulator, is protected. Departmental decisions put it this way:
The Secretary has held that where the complainant has
a reasonable belief that the respondent is violating the
law, other motives he may have for engaging in
protected activity are irrelevant ....

The purpose of

the whistleblower statutes is to encourage employees
to come forward with complaints of health hazards so
that remedial action may be taken, and if such a
course of action furthers the employee's own selfish
agenda, so be it. This approach is consistent with case
law under other federal statutes. For example, the
Merit Systems Protection Board has held that
regardless of a whistleblower's alleged personal
motivations, the law's protections extend to employees
70
who reasonably believe in their charges.
d) No Actual Violation is Required for Protection

pretextual when the employer retaliated because the employee bypassed her
superior to complain).
170. Oliver v. Hydro-Vac Services, Inc., 91-SWD-1, electronic slip op. at 8
(Sec'y Nov. 1, 1995) (quoting Berube v. GSA, 30 M.S.P.R. 581, 596 (1986),
vacated, 820 F.2d 396 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Gores v. Dep't. of Veterans Affairs, 68
M.S.P.R. 100, 114 n.4 (1995)). See also Smith v. Western Sales & Testing, ARB
No. 02-080, 2001-CAA-17, slip op. at 8 (ARB Mar. 31, 2004); Jones v. EG & G
Def. Materials, Inc., ARB No. 97-129, ALJ No. 95-CAA-3, electronic slip op. at 13
(ARB Sept. 29, 1998); Nichols v. Gordon Trucking Inc., ARB No. 97-88, 1997STA-2, slip op. at 1 (ARB July 17, 1997) (motivation in making safety complaints
has no bearing on whether the complaints are protected); Hasan v. Sargent &
Lundy, 2000-ERA-7, electronic slip op. at 4 (ALJ Dec. 5, 2002).
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The complainant need not prove at trial that the employer actually
violated a statute, regulation or other applicable standard. The
complainant must only show a reasonable basis to think there was
improper activity.' 7 ' The significance of the employee's background
can be seen in Kalkunte v. DVI FinancialServices, Inc.172 In Kalkunte,
the employer fell into such financial trouble that it eventually filed for
bankruptcy. There, the trial judge found a report that senior managers
had altered delinquency reports and incorporated them into public
disclosure statements was a protected disclosure of a blatant fraud on
investors. The complainant also alleged that, following default, the
employer improperly commingled funds with a subsidiary, which
violated SEC regulations. As in-house counsel, the complainant had a
reasonable basis to believe these acts violated the law, in part because
documentary evidence supported the allegations.' 73
An employee's refusal to follow employer instructions believed to
be illegal is also protected under the ERA and the STAA. 1 74 The ERA
regulations also require the worker to identify the illegal conduct to the
employer.' 75
3. Adverse Action
a) The Nuclear/Environmental Acts and AIR 21
For the Secretary of Labor to grant relief, an employer must have
taken an adverse employment action. Under AIR 21, for example, no

171. Halloum v. Intel Corp., ARB No. 04-068, 2003-SOX-7, slip op. at 6

(ARB Jan. 31, 2006) (holding a reasonable but mistaken belief that the employer
had violated securities laws is protected); Melendez v. Exxon Chems. Ams., ARB
No. 1996-051, ALJ No. 1993-ERA-6, slip op. at 20 (ARB July 14, 2000), available
at http://www.oalj.dol.gov/public/wblower/decsn/93era06e.htm (affirming and
applying prior holdings such as that in Minard v. Nerco Delamar Co., Case No. 92SWD-1, slip op. at 7-16 (Sec'y Jan. 25, 1994) (holding that the complainant must
actually believe the employer is violating a statute or regulation, and the belief
must be objectively reasonable for a person with the employee's training and
experience).
172. Kalkunte v. DVI Fin. Servs., Inc., 2004-SOX-56 (ALJ July 18, 2005).
173. See also Hunter v. Northrop Grumman Synoptics, 2005-SOX-8 (ALJ
June 22, 2005).
174. § 5851(a)(1)(B); § 31105(a)(1)(A).
175. 29 C.F.R. § 24.2(c)(2).
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employer may "discharge an employee or otherwise discriminate
against an employee with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment" in retaliation for a protected activity. 76
The operative language is similar to that of the environmental
whistleblower acts and Title VII.
Except under the STAA, implementing regulations under all of the
discussed statutes offer redress for retaliation that does not immediately
pinch an employee's pocket through a termination, suspension or
demotion.
The Secretary maintains an employer "otherwise
discriminate[s]" and incurs liability when it "intimidates, threatens,
restrains, coerces, [or] blacklists" a protected employee.' 77 The
regulations for the recent Pipeline Safety Act are essentially
identical. 178 The Secretary turned aside objections to this regulatory
augmentation of the statutory text, declaring "the language [of the
regulation] is simply a fuller statement of the scope of prohibited
conduct, which encompasses discrimination of any kind with respect to
the terms, conditions or privileges of employment."'1 79 The Secretary's
considered interpretation of how broadly whistleblower protection
extends, an interpretation made through the rulemaking process, is
entitled to respect in the federal courts. The statutory authority to
adjudicate whistleblower protection matters, coupled with the
Secretary's repeated use of notice-and-comment rulemaking to define
forbidden discrimination broadly under the nuclear, environmental and
other whistleblower acts that Congress has not objected to over many
years, 180 should insulate the definitions from attack. 181

176. § 42121(a) (emphasis added).
177. 29 C.F.R. § 24.2(b) and (c) (for the nuclear and environmental acts) and
29 C.F.R. § 1979.102(b) (for the AIR 21 act).
178. 29 C.F.R. § 1981.102(b).
179. 63 Fed. Reg. 6614, 6616 (February 9, 1998) (rejecting comments
criticizing the definition in the regulations proposed to implement the Energy
Policy Act of 1992 that had amended the ERA).
180. See 63 Fed. Reg. 6614, 6616 (Feb. 9, 1998) (the final Part 24 nuclear and
environmental regulations); 68 Fed. Reg. 14099 (Mar. 21, 2003) (the final AIR 21
regulations); and 70 Fed. Reg. 17889 (Apr. 8, 2005) (the final Pipeline Safety
regulations).
181. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 at 230, n.12 (2001) (citing
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)). Mead
stated that the high level of judicial deference described in Chevron is due to an
agency's application or interpretation of a statute where Congress gave the agency
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b) The SOX Act
The SOX statute states its prohibitions more thoroughly than the
text of the environmental acts, the AIR 21 statute and Title VII, but not
quite as expansively as the Secretary's AIR 21 and
nuclear/environmental regulations. Congress forbids a SOX employer
to "discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass or in any other
manner discriminate against an employee" with respect to the
employee's compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment.182 The SOX regulation at 29 C.F.R. § 1980.102(b)
repeats these statutory proscriptions without embellishment because the
Secretary believes that the statute "specifically describes the types of
adverse actions prohibited under the Act.' 83 If forbidden threats and
harassment also encompass acts that intimidate, restraint, coerce and
(or) blacklist employees, the SOX statute and the Secretary's other
whistleblower regulations afford identical safeguards.
c) The STAA Act
The Administrative Review Board treats claims about adverse
actions under the STAA statute uniquely. The text of that act forbids
an employer to discharge or "to discipline or discriminate against an
employee regarding pay, terms, or privileges of employment .... 5184
While the language of the STAA Act is similar to the other
whistleblower protections statutes, the language of the SOX statute
remains broader. The Secretary's STAA regulations do not describe
the obligations of the STAA with characteristic expansiveness, to take
in conduct that "intimidates, threatens, restrains, coerces, [or]
85
blacklists" a protected employee.'

the authority to engage in notice-and-comment rulemaking or the formal
adjudication of statutory rights.
182. § 1514A(a) (emphasis added).
183. 69 Fed. Reg. 52103, 52106 (Aug. 24, 2004) (Secretary's comments on the
final SOX regulations).
184. § 31105(a)(1)(A).
185. Compare the STAA regulations at 29 C.F.R Part 1978, that lack any
subsection on "obligations and prohibited acts" with 29 C.F.R. § 24.2(b) and (c) for
the nuclear and environmental acts; 29 C.F.R. § 1979.102(b) for the AIR 21 act;
and 29 C.F.R. § 181.102(b) for the Pipeline Safety Act.
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d) Tangible job consequences
The terms "adverse employment action" and "tangible job
consequence" have been used almost interchangeably in Title VII
decisions. The Supreme Court has defined a tangible job consequence
as one that "constitutes a significant change in employment status, such
as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly
different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in
benefits."' 86 The EEOC and some courts of appeals disagree over
which types of employment actions Title VII reaches. In turn, the
Secretary's Administrative Review Board and administrative law
judges have struggled to determine which adverse personnel actions
whistleblowers may contest in the Department's administrative
proceedings.
Terminations and suspensions are not the only actions that
employees have challenged successfully. The EEOC broadly interprets
"adverse employment action" under Title VII to include "any adverse
treatment that is based on a retaliatory motive and is reasonably likely
to deter a charging party or others from engaging in protected
activity."' 187 A job transfer that does not result in a loss of pay
nonetheless may be remediable.' 88 The Ninth Circuit embraces this
89
broad interpretation of Title VII's anti-retaliation provision.'
Likewise, the Tenth Circuit holds that any act that causes more than de
minimis impact on a plaintiffs future employment opportunities may be
90
actionable retaliation.'

186. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998).
187. EEOC Compliance Manual § 8, "Retaliation," 8008 (1998).
188. Stone, 115 F.3d at 1571 (demotion and transfer to a less favorable job
with less prestigious, less essential tasks amounted to a tangible employment action
by the employer).
189. See Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1243 (9th Cir. 2000) ("This
provision does not limit what type of discrimination is covered, nor does it
prescribe a minimum level of severity for actionable discrimination").
190. Hillig v. Rumsfeld, 381 F.3d 1028, 1033-1035 (10th Cir. 2004).
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Other courts specifically reject the EEOC's broad notion of what
constitutes an "adverse employment action" under Title VII. 19' The
Seventh Circuit held that oral or written reprimands under a progressive
discipline system were not "tangible job consequences" Title VII would
remedy. 192 A reprimand is not adverse because it may bring the
employee closer to termination. "Such a course [is] not an inevitable
consequence of every reprimand, however; job-related criticism can
prompt an employee to improve her performance and thus lead to a
' 93
new and more constructive employment relationship."'
The Board followed the Seventh Circuit Oest decision in an STAA
case where a truck driver received a second warning letter for refusing
to comply with management's policy that he log his breaks as off duty
time, rather than as "on duty, not driving" when he took rest stops
inside the cab of his truck.' 94 He claimed that the employer's policy
violated U. S. Department of Transportation regulations, and that its
written warning discriminated against him. 195 The Board found he
engaged in protected activity, but held he failed to state a claim because
the new warning, which moved him closer to serious discipline,
imposed no "tangible job consequences" for the Secretary to remedy.
"[A]lthough we agree that the STAA is aimed at preventing [employer]
intimidation of employees for exercising their rights, intimidation does
not equate with adverse action." 196 The Board similarly found no
adverse employment action was involved where
the driver received a
97
written warning for excessive absenteeism. 1

191. See White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 364 F.3d 789, 798 (6th Cir.
2004) (en banc) (rejecting the EEOC interpretation in a Title VII retaliation claim),
cert.granted,No. 05-259, 74 USLW 3334 (U.S. Dec. 5, 2005).
192. Oest v. I11. Dep't of Corr., 240 F.3d 605, 613 (7th Cir. 2001).
193. Id.
194. West v. Kasbar, Inc., ARB No. 04-155, 2004-STA-34 (ARB Nov. 30,

2005).
195. Id.
196. Id. slip op. at 5.
197. Agee v. ABF Freight Sys., Inc., ARB No. 04-182, AU No. 2004-STA40 (ARB Dec. 29, 2005). Agee's claim also became moot because the applicable
collective bargaining agreement permitted discipline for absenteeism only within
nine months of a written warning, which expired while the matter was being
litigated. He failed to argue that the nine-month limit on the warning's
effectiveness allowed too little time to fully litigate the issue while the controversy
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In Hendrix v. American Airlines, Inc., the trial judge thoroughly
analyzed discordant administrative decisions1 98 on the meaning of
"adverse action" under whistleblower protection statutes, especially the
concept of "tangible job consequences."' 99 She also discussed the
different views the courts of appeals have expressed about how this
concept applies in Title VII cases.2"' The judge utilized the definition
developed under Title VII in the Tenth Circuit, where the facts arose.
was live, so that argument was waived. Neither did his request for attorney fees or
for injunctive relief overcome the mootness problem.
198. Some decisions hold that a complainant must show the employer's action
had some "tangible job consequence." See Shelton v. Oak Ridge Nat'l
Laboratories, ARB No. 98-100, ALJ No. 1995-CAA-19 (ARB Mar. 30, 2001)
(holding that in the absence of a tangible job consequence, a verbal reprimand and
accompanying disciplinary memo were not adverse actions); Ilgenfritz v. U.S.
Coast Guard, ARB No. 99-066, ALJ No. 1999-WPC-3 (ARB Aug. 28, 2001)
(holding that a negative performance evaluation, absent tangible job consequences,
is not an adverse action); Calhoun v. United Parcel Service, ARB No. 00-026, ALJ
No. 1999-STA-7 (ARB Nov. 27, 2002) (holding that a supervisor's criticism does
not qualify as an adverse action); Jenkins v. U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, ARB No. 1998-146, ALJ No. 1988-SWD-2 (ARB Feb. 28, 2003) (citing
to Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761, for the proposition that an adverse action must have a
tangible job consequence). See also Dolan v. EMC Corp., 2004-SOX-1 (ALJMar.
24, 2004) and Robichaux v. American Airlines, 2002-AIR-27 (ALJMay 2, 2003).
This is not a consistent view, however. Other Board decisions define "adverse
action" more broadly. See Bassett v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., No. 85-ERA34 (Sec'y Sept. 28, 1993) (holding that negative comments in a performance
evaluation can constitute adverse action, without a showing of adverse economic
impact); Guitierrez v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., ARB No. 1999-116, ALJ No.
1998-ERA-19 (ARB Nov. 13, 2002) (holding that the narrative portion of a
performance appraisal constituted an adverse action, even if the ultimate rating did
not because the performance assessment was a factor in determining the
complainant's salary). See also Vamadore v. Oak Ridge Nat'l Lab., Nos. 92-CAA2, 5, 93-CAA-1, 94-CAA-2, 3 (ARB June 14, 1996); Boytin v. Pa. Power and
Light Co., No. 94-ERA-32 (Sec'y Oct. 20, 1995).
199. Hendrix v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 2004-AIR-10, 2004-SOX-23, slip op. at
11-14 (ALJ Dec. 9, 2004).
200. According to the trial judge's analysis in Hendrix, the Second and Third
Circuits limit an "adverse action" under Title VII to something that "materially
affects" the terms and conditions of employment, relying on Torres v. Pisano, 116
F.3d 625, 640 (2nd Cir. 1997) and Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286,
1300 (3d Cir. 1997). The Fifth and Eight circuits hold that only an "ultimate
employment action" constitutes an adverse action. See Mattem v. Eastman Kodak
Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707 (5th Cir. 1997); Lederberger v. Stangler, 122 F.3d 1142,
1144 (8th Cir. 1997).
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She pointed out in a footnote that the text of the SOX Act differs from
other whistleblower statutes in explicitly prohibiting threats and
harassment - acts that are not necessarily tangible and certainly not
ultimate employment actions. This led to a finding that placing the
complainant on a lay-off list qualified as an adverse action, even though
he suffered no tangible consequence because his name was removed
before the lay-offs took effect. Later in the decision, however, the
judge found that there was no connection between protected activity
and the placement on the lay-off list.
Whistleblower protection has been held to cover poor performance
appraisals that are meant to dissuade others from whistle blowing,
which stifles the employee disclosures Congress sought to
encourage.2 ' Decisions at the Office of Administrative Law Judges
are not unanimous on the point, however. Dolan v. EMC Corp. held
that an unfavorable performance evaluation that did not reduce the
complainant's salary, directly jeopardized his job security, or cause any
tangible job detriment was not a remediable adverse employment
action.20 2 The court in Dolan also dismissed the complaint as untimely;
however, the decision did not discuss whether the text of the SOX
statute that proscribes threats and harassment, together with actions
such as discharge, demotion and suspension, reaches an evaluation.
Actions that just leave an employee unhappy trigger no protections.
When more senior managers immediately recognize that a line
supervisor has bungled a matter, and 203
thoroughly abort any adverse
arises.
action
of
cause
no
consequences,
4. Causal Connection
The protected activity must have irked the employer in a way that
contributed to the adverse action. It need not be the action's sole or
201. Daniel v. TIMCO Aviation Servs., Inc., 2002-AIR-26 (ALJ June 11,

2003); Halloum v. Intel Corp., 2003-SOX-7 (ALJ Mar. 4, 2004).
202. Dolan, 2004-SOX-1, slip op. at 4.

203. McNeill v. Crane Nuclear Inc., ARB No. 2002-002, ALJ No. 2001-ERA3 (ARB July 29, 2005). See also Ciofani v. Roadway Express, Inc., 2004-STA-46
(ALJ Nov. 18, 2004) (trial judge granted summary judgment in the employer's
favor because it had rescinded all three suspension letters that were involved in the
complaint, the employee had not served any of the suspensions, and all references
to the suspension letters were removed from his personnel file. The complainant
lost no time, wages or benefits due to the suspension letters.).
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even its dominant cause. As will be discussed, this requires a clear
chronology and knowledge on the part of the employer. The inquiry
into the employer's motives is "highly context-specific. 20 4
a) Chronology
The protected activity must precede the adverse action. Slattery v.
Swiss Reinsurance American Corp. affirmed a summary judgment for
the employer despite the temporal proximity of an EEOC charge to a
subsequent probation and discharge. 20 5 Temporal proximity may
permit the fact finder to infer a causal nexus. In Slattery, no causal
nexus was found because "the adverse employment actions were both
part, and the ultimate product, of 'an extensive period of progressive
discipline' which began when [the employer] diminished Slattery's job
responsibilities a full five months prior to his filing of the EEOC
charges.,20 6 "Where ...gradual adverse job actions began well before
the plaintiff had ever engaged in any protected activity, an inference of
retaliation does not arise. '"207

Decisions such as Couty v. Dole"0 8 teach that, for procedural,
burden-shifting purposes, "temporal proximity is sufficient as a matter
of law to establish the final required element in a prima facie case of
retaliatory discharge." In Couty, nearly thirty days had elapsed between
the protected activity and the termination. A complainant generally
satisfies this element with a showing that the protected20 9 activity
preceded the adverse action, and that the employer knew of it.

204. Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271,280-81 (3d Cir.2000).

205. Slatterly v. Swiss Reinsurance America, Corp., 248 F.3d 87 (2d Cir.
2001).
206. Id. at 95.
207. Id.; see also Halloum, ARB No. 04-068, slip op. at 7 (holding a

performance improvement plan imposed on a poorly performing employee before
he brought any allegations of securities fraud to the SEC could not have a
retaliatory purpose, but onerous modifications made to it after his SEC complaint
could).

208. Couty v. Dole, 886 F.2d 147, 148 (8th Cir. 1989) (nearly thirty days
elapsed between the protected activity and the termination).
209. Carroll v. United States Dep't of Labor, 78 F.3d 352, 356 (8th Cir. 1996)
(the adverse action must come "so closely in time as to justify an inference of
retaliatory motive"); Bechtel Constr. Co. v. Sec'y of Labor, 50 F.3d 926 (11th Cir.
1995).
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An extensive gap between animus and the adverse employment
2 10
action may defeat the causation element of the prima facie case.
For example, in Scott v. Suncoast Beverage Sales, Ltd., two and onehalf years earlier a co-worker, who later became the black
employee's supervisor, said that, "we will burn his black ass., 21 1 The
plaintiff contended that racial attitudes are slow to change and
comment should be treated as direct evidence. The court regarded it
as too far removed in time and too indirectly connected to the
termination decision.212
Temporal proximity used to establish the causation element of the
McDonnell-Douglas framework when the claimant's evidence is
circumstantial may not carry the day when the judge ultimately weighs
all the proof to decide whether the protected activity caused or
contributed to the adverse action. Close timing alone is rather weak
evidence. When paired with additional proof, such as inconsistencies
in an employer's statements about the reasons for the adverse action,
there is sounder basis to find causation. Strong countervailing evidence
may lead the judge to conclude that retaliation had nothing to do with
the adverse action.
Bear in mind that the element of the claim is causation, not its
proxy, temporal proximity.213 Hard and fast rules setting a maximum
acceptable time interval between the protected activity and the adverse
action that take no account of the facts can reward guile. The
complainant may be one of a small group of skilled or professional
employees who cannot easily be replaced, or engaged in significant ongoing projects that would deter a sophisticated employer from
precipitous retribution. It may bide its time before retaliating.2 14 The

210. See Scott v. Suncoast Beverage Sales, Ltd., 295 F.3d 1223 (1lth Cir.

2002).
211. Id. at 1227. This statement was not regarded as direct evidence of racial
motivation for termination. Had it been, there would have been no need to analyze
the adequacy of the prima facie case, which applies to cases made with

circumstantial evidence.
212. See also Lewis v. Holsum of Fort Wayne, Inc., 278 F.3d 706 (7th Cir.
2002) (four-month interval between protected activity and discharge was regarded
as too long to support an inference of retaliation).
213. Kachmar v. SunGard Data Sys., Inc., 109 F.3d 173, 178 (3d Cir.1997).
214. Id. at 178.
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evidence viewed as a whole may merit the inference that a remote
protected event sparked retaliation.
Where "temporal proximity... is missing, courts may look to the
intervening period for other evidence of retaliatory animus. ' 21 5
Ongoing antagonism following the protected activity is that kind of
proof.216 The claimant should be permitted to offer a broad range of
evidence to shed light on the elusive issue of the employer's
motivation.
b) Knowledge
At a minimum, someone in a position to affect the complainant's
employment must have known of the protected activity before the
adverse action was taken; the employer must act at least partially from
a retaliatory motive.21 7
The person who signs a complainant's poor performance appraisal,
reprimand, suspension or dismissal letter may be too far removed from
the situation to know much, if anything, about the matter. If someone
in the chain of command engineered the adverse action, the
complainant is protected.218 Layers of "bureaucratic ignorance" do not

215. Jensen v. Potter, 435 F.3d 444 (3rd Cir. 2006).
216. Robinson v. Se. Pa. Trans. Auth., 282 F.2d 892, 894 (3rd. Cir 1993).
217. Shirani v. Comed/Exelon Corp., ARB No. 03-100, ALJ No. 2002-ERA28 slip op. at 9-10 (ARB Sept. 30, 2005) (affirming fimding that complainant lacked
supervisory and financial auditing qualifications for the position he sought after a
corporate restructuring, and that the manager responsible for hiring after the
restructuring never knew of his earlier complaints about safety deficiencies in
nuclear operations). See also Weil v. Planet Airways, Inc., ARB No. 04-074, 2003AIR-18, slip op. at 2 (ARB Oct. 31, 2005); Peck v. Safe Air Int'l, Inc., ARB No.
02-028, ALJ No. 2001-AIR-3, slip op. at 14 (ARB Jan. 30, 2004).
218. See Ezell, 400 F.3d at 1051; Cariglia v. Hertz Equip. Rental Corp., 363 F.3d
77 (1 st Cir. 2004) (discharge decision came from unbiased decision makers who acted
on inaccurate, misleading or incomplete facts compiled by a biased employee.
Judgment for employer reversed with directions to make findings about whether the
information source withheld exculpatory information out of bias); Henrich v. Ecolab,
Inc., 2004-SOX-51 (ALJ Nov. 23, 2004) (credible evidence that complainant's
immediate supervisors knew of his protected activity may be imputed to outside
executives who had ultimate authority over the complainant's employment.). See also
the analysis of the law of agency as it relates to corporate responsibility for the acts of
middle managers in Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762-63 and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,
524 U.S. 775, 807-08 (1998) (involving sexual harassment claims).
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shield an employer from liability.2 1 9 Different types of circumstantial
proof may be used in different types of cases. For example, a refusal to
hire/blacklisting, claim may require a complainant to show that job
openings existed. Consider this example from a Seventh Circuit case:
an engineer applies to employers serially. When he isn't hired, he
claims he was blackballed for past whistle blowing, arguing that large
corporations must have openings for engineers. The claim fails. He
must prove either during his case in chief or in his opposition to the
potential employer's summary judgment motion that he was qualified
for identifiable open positions. According to the Seventh Circuit:
His burden is to show that after filing the charge that
he claims provoked the retaliation, only he, and not
any similarly situated job applicant who did not file a
charge, was not hired even though he was qualified for
It is doubtful
the job for which he was applying ....
whether Hasan was qualified for the job for which he
was turned down ... 220
5. A Prima Facie Case made with Circumstantial Evidence Raises a
Rebuttable Presumption of Discrimination
If the employer is wholly silent after the complainant presents an
adequate prima facie case, the complainant prevails. It is unlikely an
employer will fumble so badly at trial.
Once an employer articulates a legitimate non-discriminatory
reason for its action, the presumption disappears. Then the complainant
must show by the preponderance of the evidence that discrimination
22 1
motivated the adverse action.
Some administrative law judges find it helpful to go through the
prime facie case analysis explicitly when direct evidence of
discriminatory animus is not offered to ensure all the necessary
elements are covered. The Board frequently chides judges for doing
219. Frazier v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 672 F.2d 150, 166 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(applying the predecessor to the current Whistleblower Protection Act for federal
employees).
220. Hasan v. Dept. of Labor, 400 F.3d 1001, 1004 (7th Cir. 2005).
221. See Reeves, 530 U. S. at 143; St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 510
(1993); Aikens, 460 U. S. at 714.
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After recognizing the utility of the McDonnell Douglas

framework, it said:
The amended ERA certainly does not preclude a
complainant from presenting a circumstantial case of
retaliation at a hearing before a Department of Labor
ALJ. Nor do the 1992 amendments dictate or suggest
that an ALJ,or this Board, not rely, when appropriate,
upon the established and familiar Title VII
methodology for analyzing and discussing evidentiary
burdens of proof. Indeed, when the Board recently
applied the Title VII pretext framework in an ERA
case brought under the amended Act, we explained
that because most ERA complaints are grounded on
circumstantial evidence of retaliatory intent, "this
Board and reviewing courts routinely apply the
framework of burdens developed for pretext analysis
under

Title VII. ' 223

However,

we

continue

to

discourage the unnecessary discussion of whether or
not a whistleblower has established a prima facie case
when a case has been fully tried.2 24

The preference for not setting the structure of the decision based on
burden shifting comports with the conclusion the U. S. Supreme Court
reached in U.S. Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens. 225 The
prima facie case analysis of McDonnell Douglas and its progeny is
rooted in the federal rules of civil procedure as applied in course of jury
trials. If either the plaintiff or the employer fails to provide sufficient
proof for their argument by the close of their case, judgment as a matter
222. See Kester v. Carolina Power & Light Co., ARB No. 02-007, ALJ No.
2000-ERA-31, slip op. at 3, n. 12(ARB Sept. 30, 2003).
223. See Overall v. Tennessee Valley Auth., ARB Nos. 98-111, 98-128, ALJ
No. 97-ERA-53, slip op. at 14 (ARB April 30, 2001) (citing two pre-1992
amendment ERA cases); Williams v. Baltimore City Pub. Schools Sys., ARB No.
01-021, ALJ No. 00-CAA-15, slip op. at n.7 (ARB May 30, 2003) (emphasis
added).
224. Kester, ARB No. 02-007, slip op. at 3.
225. Aikens, 460 U.S. at 711 (claiming racial discrimination under the Civil
Rights Act for a failure to promote) and Reeves, 530 U.S. at 133 (claiming age
discrimination under the ADEA).
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of law is entered against the party that failed in its proof and the court
takes the matter from the jury.2 26 Motions of that type are generally
inappropriate under the federal APA, where the administrative law
judge considers all the evidence the parties present.227
An administrative law judge reaches a decision on the basis of the
record as a whole. The issue comes down to whether there was
invidious discrimination, as Aikens points out.228 It makes no
difference whether the judge's conclusion is drawn from direct or
circumstantial evidence of discriminatory animus, or a blend of both.229
Moreover, the recommended decision and order the judge enters in
whistleblower cases is not the equivalent of a district court's final
judgment. It is a decision that may be subject to action by the
Administrative Review Board before it becomes final.23°
C. The Employer's Burden of Going Forward
The employer must state its legitimate, non-discriminatory reason
for the adverse employment action with enough specificity that the
complainant has a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate that the
reason given is pretextual. The employer's burden is only one of going
forward; this "involve[s] no credibility assessment. '2 3' The ultimate
burden of persuasion on the issue of invidious discrimination remains
with the employee.
The employer need not prove the reason(s) it articulates motivated
its adverse action, but must show enough to raise an issue of fact. The

226. FED. R. Civ. P. 50.
227. The trial judge in Sysco Foods of Baltimore did more than enter an oral
order of dismissal at the close of the complaint's inadequate prima facie case, when
the employer moved for a "non-suit." Sysco Foods of Baltimore, ARB No. 03 134
at 3. The judge wrote a detailed recommended order of dismissal after reviewing
the trial transcript. In contrast, pre-trial motions for summary decision are
They are practically
permitted under 29 C.F.R. § 18.40 and 18.41.
indistinguishable from motions for summary judgment under FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
228. See also Blum v. Witco Chem. Corp., 829 F.2d 367, 372, n. 2 (3d
Cir. 1987) ("Once a case has been fully litigated, however, it is unnecessary for the
appellate court to decide whether a prima facie case had, in fact, been established").
229. Desert Palace,Inc., 539 U.S. at 90.
230. See infra notes 288-296 and accompanying text.
231. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 509 U. S. at 509.
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employer is likely to offer actual, though perhaps not all, reasons for
what it did. Typical reasons include:
1. The complainant is not as qualified for a job as other
candidates;
2. Inability to get along with co-workers or supervisors;
3. Misconduct or insubordination;
4. Business exigencies (e.g., the need to lay workers off); or
5. Poor performance or absenteeism.
D. Complainant'sProofof Pretext
The complainant must convince the judge that the reason or reasons
the employer proffered for the adverse action are merely pretexts for
discrimination. When the matter reaches trial, the complainant's
burden of proving pretext merges with the ultimate burden to persuade
the judge that he or she has suffered intentional discrimination.
Inferences drawn from the prima facie case may be considered in
determining whether to accept or reject the reasons the employer
232
articulated for its adverse employment action.
A pair of AIR 21 cases illustrate how employers may prevail on the
issue of pretext. When an employer proved that a pilot had a history of
complaints about unprofessional behavior and poor interpersonal skills
with co-workers, and a disrespectful attitude towards his supervisor, it
persuaded the trial judge that the pilot's report of a safety concern did
not contribute even partially to the decision to terminate him for the
belligerent and unprofessional manner in which the concern was
communicated.233
Similarly, another employer successfully
demonstrated that it placed a pilot on long term sick leave for acts that
indicated emotional instability; its decision was unrelated to the pilot's
earlier complaint about the airline's failure to remove the checked
luggage of two passengers who had been prevented from taking a flight
due for currency violations. His protected activity and the employer's
adverse action were separated by intervening events that defeated an

232. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 143 (once the employer provides a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the personnel decision, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to
show by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer's benign explanation
was contrived to obscure a discriminatory motive).
233. Svendsen v. Air Methods, Inc., ARB No. 03-074, 2002-AIR-16, slip op.
at 8 (ARB Aug. 26, 2004).
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inference of causation, and adequately
explained the employer's
234
evaluation.
fitness
the
decision to require
A case based on circumstantial evidence does not end because the
employee proves the employer's reason for its adverse action is untrue
or a pretext. The employee still must convince the fact finder that the
adverse action was motivated by invidious discrimination. 235 Summary
judgment was affirmed for the governmental employer in Neal v.
Roche, where the plaintiff conceded in motion papers that the true
reason she was not promoted was not prohibited by statute, despite the
fact that the government had concealed this reason with a pretextual
explanation. 236 The civilian promoted to the job the plaintiff wanted
had been selected to protect her from an impending lay-off because her
job slot was slated to become a military one. It made no difference that
the government offered a false reason for the promotion. A plaintiff
prevails only by showing that an invidious motive contributed to the
adverse action, although it may not be the only reason.237
Pretext can be shown by various means, including:
1. Direct evidence: These are rare actions or statements of an
employer that betoken discriminatory intent. With direct proof of
retaliatory motivation, pretext analysis should not even apply.
2. Comparative evidence: This refers to proof that someone else
similarly situated with respect to performance, qualifications and
conduct did not receive the same adverse treatment, or to proof that
the employer departed from its established policies and practices.
3. Inherent implausibility: The factual underpinnings for the
reason the employer puts forward may beggar belief. For example,
the employee's personnel file includes good recent performance
evaluations, the adverse action is temporally proximate to the
protected activity, and no credible evidence of intervening poor
performance explains the employer's action.

234. Robinson v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., ARB No. 04-041, ALJ No. 2003AIR-22 (ARB Nov. 30, 2005).
235. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 502.
236. Neal v. Roche, 349 F.3d 1246 (10th Cir. 2003).
237. There can be various reasons for a lay-off, as will be discussed in the
mixed motive analysis below. See infra notes 243-260 and accompanying text.
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4. Inconsistent explanations for the adverse action: These lead
the fact finder to infer that the employer fabricated reasons to
238
disguise discriminatory animus and cannot keep its story straight.
5. Statistics: This is rarely seen in Department of Labor
adjudications, perhaps because data is too expensive.
Comparisons raise the difficult issue of whether the other employee
or employees the complainant proposes to use as comparators were
"similarly situated." In Hasan v. Department of Labor, for example,
when an instructor at a training center was first reprimanded for theft of
food meant for students, and later fired for doing so again, she faced a
difficult proof problem when she claimed that she really had been fired
in retaliation for a sexual harassment claim she made four months
earlier.2 39 The court of appeals affirmed a summary judgment against
her because "she failed at the threshold by presenting no evidence that
similarly situated employees (repetitive food thieves) were treated more
leniently than she was.,,240 The employer often successfully shows
dissimilarities between the complainant and other employees. The
situations need not be identical; it would be very difficult for any
employee to prevail if that were the standard. 241 The language about
"repetitive food thieves" in the 7th Circuit's Hasan decision may not
accurately represent the state of the law, even within the 7th Circuit.
Showing that an employee of another race or gender received treatment
that is more favorable after a second infraction as serious as removing
student's food from the center could set up a valid comparison under
Ezell's approach to comparators. 242 Reading between the lines in
Hasan, the instructor's recidivism may have been the nub of her
problem.
Theoretically the employer also may show that the challenged
business practice was random or did not follow a predictable pattern,
but this likely would be difficult to prove.

238. See, e.g., Vieques Air Link, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 437 F.3d. 102
(lst Cir Feb. 2, 2006); Bechtel, 50 F.3d at 935.
239. Hasan, 400 F.3d at 1001.

240. Id. at 1005.
241. Ezell, 400 F.3d at 1051.
242. Id. at 1050.
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E. Mixed Motive Cases
People act from more than a single motivation. An employer
harboring permissible and impermissible reasons for an adverse action
may never have considered their relative weight. After the fact, it can
be difficult or impossible to portray any one as the "primary"
consideration, the "but-for" factor, or the "necessary and sufficient"
cause. The analytic starting points for this issue are the U. S. Supreme
Court decisions in Mt. Healthy City Board of Education v. Doyle 243 and
244
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.
Mt. Healthy involved an annual-contract schoolteacher whose
employment was not renewed at the end of the year he was up for
tenure. 245 He sued for reinstatement under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming
that his termination was retribution for exercising his First Amendment
right to free speech.2 46 The trial judge had found that political speech
played a substantial role in the school board's decision not to renew his
employment.2 4 7 The lower court ordered reinstatement, which had the
incidental effect of granting tenure.2 48 The Court vacated the judgment
when it ruled the teacher could obtain re-employment only by showing
that the Board terminated him in retribution for his political speech.24 9
If the Board had adequate independent reasons not to renew his
teaching contract, it would prevail. The matter was remanded for the
necessary additional fact finding. This "mixed-motive" or "dual
motive" test for liability shifts the burden of persuasion, not just
production, to the employer when the employee has made out a prima
facie case.
The employer must persuade the fact finder by a
preponderance of evidence that it would have taken the same action
even in the absence of the protected activity or of any discriminatory
motive.
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, a Title VII case, holds the
employer's burden in a mixed motive discrimination case is tantamount

243. Mt. Healthy City Bd. ofEd., 429 U.S. at 274.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.

Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 228 (plurality opinion).
Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed, 492 U.S. at 274.
Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996)).
Id. at 284.
Id. at 286.
Id. at 287.
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to proving an affirmative defense.25 0 Here, a woman was denied
partnership. 251 Because Title VII does not require clear and convincing
evidence to prove a claim, if an employer permitted sex stereotyping to
play a part in an employment decision, it must prove by a
preponderance of evidence that it would have made the same decision
in the absence of discrimination.252
Importing this Title VII analysis to whistleblower claims, an
employer who carried its burden by a preponderance of evidence bore
no liability to the whistleblower. The Administrative Review Board
explained:
There are situations, however, in which there is no one
"true" reason for the employer's actions, in the sense
that there was one motivation, either legitimate or
illegitimate . .

.

. The employer's burden in such a

"dual motive" case is handled much like an
"affirmative defense; the plaintiff must persuade the
fact finder on one point, and then the employer,
if it
' 25 3
wishes to prevail, must persuade it on another.
The Supreme Court's recent unanimous decision in Desert Palace,
Inc. v. Costa254 made clear that direct evidence of discrimination is not
required to prove a mixed-motive bias case. This issue had been in
doubt since 1989 because of the Supreme Court's badly fractured
rationale in Price Waterhouse, where the concurring opinion of Justice
O'Connor would have shifted the burden to the employer only where
there was "strong" or "direct" evidence of discrimination. 255 This was
one reason the federal courts of appeals had struggled so much to
identify what qualified as direct evidence of discrimination.
This is no longer the way ERA, AIR 21, SOX and Pipeline Safety
whistleblower matters are handled. Congress amended both the Civil
250. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 246, 250.
251. Id.

252. Id. at 253-54.
253. Ewald v. Commonwealth of Va., 89-SDW-1 (Sec'y Apr. 20, 1995)
electronic slip op. at 7, 8. See Carroll v. Bechtel Power Corp., Case No. 91-ERA0046, Sec. Dec. and Ord., Feb. 15, 1995, slip op. at 9-10.
254. Desert Palace,Inc., 539 U.S. at 90.
255. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 274-75.
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Rights Act and the ERA in the early 1990s to overrule the Supreme
Court's Price Waterhouse decision in part. The amendments to Title
VII and to the ERA were not identical, and those differences matter.
1. Civil Rights Amendments of 1991
Congress determined that "[t]he effectiveness of Title VII's ban on
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national
origin has been severely undercut by the recent Supreme Court decision
in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins."256 The Civil Rights Amendments of
1991 amended Title VII to say that "an unlawful employment practice
is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any
employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the
practice. ,,257 With this amendment, an employee who suffered an
adverse action partially motivated by invidious discrimination received
the right to declaratory and injunctive relief, and to recover attorney's
fees from the employer with mixed motives; however, they were still
not entitled to hiring, reinstatement, promotion, or back pay. It can be
dangerous to read current Title VII cases without bearing this change in
mind, and assume the same result would be reached and relief ordered
under whistleblower statutes. No similar amendment was made to the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act. The Price Waterhouse
approach, which requires the employer to prove beyond a
preponderance of the evidence that it would have taken the same action
even in the absence of discrimination still applies in mixed motive age
discrimination claims. 258 Bear this in mind when reading current
ADEA decisions.
The effect the Civil Rights Amendments of 1991 may be seen in
Rowland v. American General Finance.259 The employer maintained

256. H.R.REP. No. 102-40(I), at 45 (1991), as reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N.

549, 584.
257. Civil Rights Amendments of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107(a), 105
Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(m) (West 2003)).
258. Lewis v. YMCA, 208 F.3d 1303, 1305 (11th Cir. 2000). See also Smith
v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (2005) (narrowly construing an employer's
ADEA liability under a disparate-impact theory because Congress has never
amended the ADEA as it amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act).
259. Rowland v. Am. Gen. Fin., 340 F.3d 187 (4th Cir. 2003).
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that it did not promote a female branch manager because of complaints
from employees and customers, and a jury accepted its argument. The
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, fmding that the
district court erred when it refused to give a mixed-motive jury
instruction. There was substantial evidence of bias, and a real
possibility that, had a mixed-motive instruction had been given, the jury
could have found that sex discrimination was a motivating factor even
though the employer would have made the same decision anyway.
2. ERA Amendments
The 1992 amendments to the ERA 260 state that if a protected
activity contributed to the adverse employment action at all, the
employer must demonstrate "by clear and convincing evidence" that it
would have taken the same adverse action in the absence of the
protected activity. 61 If the employer meets the enhanced level of
proof, it escapes liability. The Civil Rights Act Amendments of 1991
do not exonerate an employer; rather, they preclude reinstatement, back
pay and some other damages. Congress adopted these enhanced
burdens of proof for employers in the AIR 21, SOX and Pipeline Safety
statutes.
Clear and convincing evidence is a more onerous burden than
preponderance of the evidence, but less than "beyond reasonable
doubt. 262
IV. WHISTLEBLOWER DAMAGES AND REMEDIES

When an employer has violated an environmental whistleblower
act, the Secretary is authorized to order five remedies: (1) affirmative
action to abate the violation; (2) reinstatement; (3) compensatory
damages; (4) costs; and (5) expenses, which include attorney's fees.
Under only two statutes, the Safe Drinking Water Act and the Toxic
Substances Control Act, may exemplary damages be awarded.

260. The Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776.
261. § 585 1(b)(3)(D); Kester, ARB No. 02-007, slip op. at n. 15.
262. Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 282 (1992); Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co.
v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 22 & n. 11 (1991); Yule v. Bums Int'l. Sec. Serv., 1993ERA-12 (Sec'y. May 2, 1995).
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A. Reinstatement

The regulations relating to nuclear and environmental safety, the
STAA, SOX and Pipeline Safety all require reinstatement when an
employee seeks it.2 63 It need not be ordered in three situations:
264
1. When the employee does not ask for it;
2. When the employee has rejected a

unconditional reinstatement offer; or 265
3. When reinstatement is not feasible.2 66

legitimate

and

The mere fact that the employer fired a whistleblower does not
establish the third factor: the impossibility of a normal working
relationship between the parties. Reinstatement is normally the remedy
granted to whistleblowers. 2 67 An employer is in a tight spot when it
seeks to demonstrate that the employee's return to work is not feasible;

it requires proof that a normal working relationship is impossible or
proof of actual medical risk to the employee. In Creekmore v. ABB
Power Systems Energy Services, Inc.,268 the judge had found in an
263. Nuclear and environmental safety regulations are located at 29 C.F.R.
§24.8(c)(1). The STAA and SOX are located at 29 C.F.R. §1979.109(a-b),
respectively. AIR 21 can be found at 29 C.F.R. 1980.109(b), while Pipeline Safety
is located at 29 C.F.R. 1981.109(b).
264. Nix v. Nehi-RC Bottling Co., 84-STA-1 (Sec'y July 13, 1984). See also
Moravec v. HC & M Transp., Inc., 90-STA-44 (Sec'y Jan. 6, 1992), slip op. at 22 &
n.14; Nidy v. Benton Enters., 90-STA- 11, slip op. at 17 n.15 (Sec'y Nov. 19, 1991);
Dale v. Step 1 Stairworks, Inc., ARB No. 04-003, 2002-STA-30 (ARB Mar. 31,
2005)(stating reinstatement is mandatory, although the Board may have been
influenced by the employee's pro se status).
265. Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 232-233 (1982).
266. Doyle v. Hydro Nuclear Servs., Inc., ARB Nos. 99-041, 99-042, 00-012,
ALI No. 89-ERA-22, slip op. at 7-8 (ARB Sept. 6, 1996), rev'd on other grounds;
Doyle v. United States Sec'y of Labor, 285 F.3d 243, 251 (3d Cir. 2002)
(reinstatement under the ERA was impractical because the company no longer
employed comparable workers, and had no positions for which he qualified);
Kalkunte v. DVI Fin. Servs., Inc., 2004-SOX-56 (ALJ July 18, 2005)
(reinstatement not an available remedy because the employer had gone bankrupt
and was no longer in business; front pay was awarded instead).
267. See Welch v. Cardinal Bankshares Corp., 2003-SOX-15 (ALJ Feb. 15,
2005) (rejecting four grounds the employer offered for not reinstating its former
chief financial officer, and holding that reinstatement is part of the "make whole"
goal of the SOX statute and the presumptive remedy for wrongful termination).
268. Creekmore v. ABB Power Sys. Energy Servs., Inc., 1993-ERA-24 slip op.
at 18 (ALJ Dec. 1, 1997).
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earlier decision that reinstatement was not inappropriate and
recommended front pay instead. The Deputy Secretary found the front
pay award inappropriate because "the observed tension between the
parties at the hearing is not sufficient to demonstrate the impossibility
269
of a productive and amicable working relationship in this case."
The higher the position the whistleblower held, the more likely it is
the former employer will claim that it is impossible to reintegrate the
whistleblower as a trusted member of management. The argument fails
on two grounds: it denies the complainant the preferred make-whole
270
remedy and it undercuts the deterrent value of reinstatement.
Reinstatement is not ordered when the job had always been meant
to be a short-term project, or when the employer shows the employee
would have been laid off in a general reduction of the workforce,
regardless of discrimination.
1. Preliminary Orders in ERA Cases
In a meritorious ERA whistleblower cases, the statute and
regulation require the judge to issue a preliminary order granting
interim relief such as reinstatement, back pay, and other actions
necessary to abate the violation, but not compensatory damages.271 In
Trueblood v. Von Roll America, Inc.,272 the Board remanded the case
where the judge had not issued the preliminary order required under
§ 24.7(c)(2) until after the employer had petitioned for review of the
Recommended Decision and Order. The judge's preliminary order of
reinstatement must be issued separately from the recommended
decision in order to be immediately effective.273

269. Id. The Deputy Secretary made the final decision because the Secretary
had recused himself.
270. Hobby v. Georgia Power Co., ARB No. 98-166, ALJ No. 1990-ERA-30,
electronic slip op. at 10 (ARB Feb. 9, 2001), affd sub. nom. Georgia Power Co. v.
U.S. Dep't of Labor, No. 01-10916 (11 th Cir. 2002) (unpublished).
271. § 585 1(b)(2)(A), 29 C.F.R. § 24.7(c)(2) (2004).

272. Trueblood v. Von Roll Am., Inc., ARB Nos. 2003-082 and 2003-083,

ALJ Nos. 2002-WPC-3 to 6 and 2003-WPC-I (ARB Apr. 30, 2003).
273. See McNeill, ARB No. 02-002; Welch, No. 7:05CV00546.
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2. Stays of Preliminary Reinstatement Ordered by OSHA in AIR 21
SOX and Pipeline Safety Matters
Reinstatement can be an issue at the outset of an AIR 21, SOX or
Pipeline Safety case if OSHA's initial investigation ordered it. These
three statutes authorize the Secretary, acting through OSHA, to exercise
an extraordinary power to order reinstatement before there has been any
evidentiary hearing. 274 Under the ERA, a judge orders reinstatement
275
and back pay only after a formal on-the-record hearing.
Employees, joined by the Secretary of Labor, have enforced the
Secretary's preliminary reinstatement order in SOX matters.276 For
instance, in Bechtel v. Competitive Technology, Inc., after the employer
requested a hearing, the administrative law judge denied its motion to
stay OSHA's preliminary reinstatement order. 77 The district court
found it had subject matter jurisdiction although a final order had not
been issued because the statute authorizes enforcement of preliminary
orders. The district court also rejected the employer's argument that the
employees were not entitled to a preliminary injunction because they
had not demonstrated the material elements for that relief, holding that
the SOX statute "makes clear that the Secretary of Labor and not the
court makes the determination of whether an order of reinstatement is
appropriate." 278 The employer was required to reinstate the workers
immediately and to pay them salary, benefits, and other compensation
they would have earned if the employer had complied with the
Department's reinstatement order when it was originally issued.27 9
The reinstatement issue ultimately became moot when the judge
dismissed the SOX complaint after trial.
In Windhauser v. Trane, the underlying case terminated by
settlement. 280 The judge nonetheless fined the employer for obstinate
failure to reinstate the employee as OSHA had ordered, even after the
274. § 42121 (b)(2)(A); § 1514A(b)(2)(A); and § 60129(b)(2(A).
275. See § 585 l(b)(2)(A).
276. Bechtel, 2005-SOX-33 and 34 (ALJ Mar. 29, 2005), in the District Court
No. Civ.3:05CV629AVC (D. Conn. May 13, 2005). Ultimately the ALJ dismissed
the complaint on the merits after trial in a decision entered on Oct. 5, 2005.
277. Id.; see the ALJ's Mar. 29, 2005 order.
278. Id.; see the District Court's May 13, 2005 order at 8.
279. Bechtel, 2005-SOX-33, 34 at 9.
280. Windhauser v. Trane, 2005-SOX-17 (ALJJune 1, 2005),
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judge denied its motion for a stay.2 8 ' Unless an administrative sanction
for such intransigence is available, the employer enjoys a passive stay,
at least until the employee can obtain district court enforcement of the
preliminary reinstatement order.282 The judge set the fine at double the
amount the employee would have earned in salary and bonuses from
the date of the OSHA order until the date of settlement of the case,
analogizing to the Department's enforcement authority under the
ADEA and the Fair Labor Standards Act.283
An exception to interim reinstatement is included in the AIR 21,
SOX, and Pipeline Safety regulations when the employer "establishes
that the complainant is a security risk., 284 This exception is narrowly
construed. The Federal Register publication of the final SOX
regulation addressed public comments that were submitted on this
aspect of the proposed regulation. The security risk exception
substitutes front pay for preliminary reinstatement when an employer
"clearly establishes" that reinstatement "might result" in physical
violence against persons (employees or customers) or property. 285 That
gloss on the regulation's text is contradictory and illogical, calling for
the employer to "clearly establish" that something "might" happen.286
The Secretary also rejected a comment from the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce that sought to broaden the exception to encompass risks to
an employer's trade secrets.2 87 "Economic reinstatement" in the form
of continued pay and benefits is the interim remedy when the employer
proves the employee is a security risk.288 This substitute remedy was

281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (the ADEA) and 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (Fair
Labor Standards Act)).
284. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1979.105(a)(1), 1980.105(a)(1), 1981.105(a)(1) (2003).
285. Procedures for the Handling of Discrimination Complaints Under Section
806 of the Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002, Title VIII of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 69 Fed. Reg. 52,109 (Aug. 24, 2004) ("SOX
Procedures").
286. Id.
287. Id. at 52,108-109.
288. Procedures for the Handling of Discrimination Complaints under Section
519 of the Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st
Century, 68 Fed. Reg. 14,100, 14,104 (Mar. 21, 2003) ("AIR 21 Procedures"); Sox
Procedures, supra note 285, at 52,108.
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borrowed from cases arising under section 105(c) of the Federal Mine
Safety and Health Act of 1977.289
The security risk exception is not found in regulations for other
whistleblower acts because they afford no pretrial relief. If an
employer succeeded at trial in proving that a whistleblower who
otherwise qualified for reinstatement presented an undue security risk if
replaced in the work site, common sense dictates that reinstatement
would not be "feasible" and the equivalent of economic reinstatement
in the form of front pay should be ordered.
B. After-Acquired Evidence of Misconduct
After a discriminatory termination, the employer may learn of facts
that would have lead it to terminate the whistleblower earlier for a
legitimate reason. These typically are uncovered in discovery (e.g.,
learning that the employee had surreptitiously copied confidential
financial documents or taped conversations with other employees
despite the employer's well established policy against doing so). The
U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged that aggressive discovery to fish for
this type of evidence can harass or punish the whistleblower, but relied
on trial judges to rectify any abuses.2 90 The employer must show that
the conduct was so significant or severe that the newly discovered fact
291
would, by itself, certainly have led to the employee's termination.
Mixed motive analysis does not apply; by definition, the lawful motive
for termination was unknown when the employer took its adverse
action.292 In a jury trial, that evidence would be admissible only in the
damages portion of the case; an administrative law judge may admit the
evidence, but consider it as relevant only to the remedy.

289. Sec'y of Labor ex. rel. York v. BR&D Enters., 23 F.M.S.H.R.C. 697
(2001). See also AIR 21 Procedures, supra note 288 at 14,104; SOX Procedures,
supra note 285, at 52,108; Procedures for the Handling of Discrimination
Complaints Under Section 6 of the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002, 70
Fed. Reg. 17,889, 17,891 (Apr. 8, 2005).
290. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 362 (1995);
see also Platone v. Atl. Coast Airline Holdings, Inc. 2003-SOX-27, slip op. at 3
(ALJ July 13, 2004).
291. Id.
292. Id. at 360.
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If a firing offense is proven, that evidence precludes reinstatement
and front pay.293 It would make no sense to reinstate someone who
could, and indeed would, be promptly terminated on reinstatement.294
The employee still can recover back pay for the period from the
unlawful discharge until the new information about earlier misconduct
was uncovered.295 That amount may be adjusted up or down whenever
there are "extraordinary equitable circumstances" on either side.29 6 The
same principles apply to fraud in an employment application. 297 But
post-termination events (e.g., evidence of the employee's drunken
driving after a discriminatory termination) are not the primary focus of
this doctrine.298 To determine whether the offense uncovered would
merit termination, "the inquiry focuses on the employer's actual
employment practices, not just the standards established in its employee
manuals, and reflects a recognition that employers often say they will
discharge employees for certain misconduct while in practice they do
299
not.,
C. Back Pay and Other Terms, Conditions,andPrivileges of
Employment
Back pay is a make-whole remedy, meant to restore the employee
to the position he or she would have been in had no discrimination

293. Id. at 361-62.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. McKennon, 513 U.S. at 362.
297. See Sheehan v. Donlen Corp., 173 F.3d 1039, 1047-1048 (7th Cir. 1999);
Reid v. Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc., 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5595, at *27 (E.D. Pa. Apr.
27, 1995).
298. McKennon, 513 U.S. at 356-63; See Sellers v. Mineta, 358 F.3d 1058,
1064 (8th Cir. 2004) (post-termination conduct can become relevant in unusual
situations, for example where post-termination misconduct would make the
employee ineligible for reinstatement, such as termination from a later job for
serious dishonesty); Medlock v. Ortho Biotech, Inc., 164 F.3d 555 (10th Cir. 1999)
(rejecting employer's claim that back pay should be reduced because it would have
fired the plaintiff for post-termination cursing at its lawyer at the unemployment
benefits hearing its discriminatory firing brought about).
299. O'Day v. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Corp., 79 F.3d 756, 759 (9th
Cir. 1996) (emphasis by the court).
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occurred.300 The amount due is what the employee would have earned
but for the discrimination. The following five elements are considered
when calculating a back pay award.
1. Burdens of Proof on Items Granted as Relief
Although the burden is on the employee to establish what the
employer owes, uncertainties in computing the amount are resolved
against the employer. 30 1 A hypothetical employment history may be
used to determine the appropriate scope of the remedy.30 2
2. Interim Earnings and Mitigation of Damages
Interim earnings are deducted from a back pay award.
compensation the employee may have received is not,
Unemployment
3
however.

30

The employer bears the burden to prove that the employee did not
properly mitigate damages. It must show that: (1) there were
substantially equivalent positions available; and (2) the employee failed
to seek them with reasonable diligence. 304 A terminated employee may
be "expected to check want ads, register with employment agencies,
300. McKennon, 513 U.S. at 357-58 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (2001);
Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978)).
301. Lederhaus v. Paschen, 1991-ERA-13 (Sec'y Oct. 26, 1992).
302. Blackburn v. Metric Constructors, Inc., 1986-ERA-4 (Sec'y Oct. 30,
1991) aff'd in regard to back pay award and rev'd on other grounds sub nom.,
Blackburn v. Martine, 982 F.2d 125 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding a loss of self esteem
that results from a forbidden termination may justify a compensatory damage
award even when the worker's post-termination annual earnings were comparable
to his pre-termination earnings).
303. Keene v. Ebasco Constructors, Inc., 95-ERA-4 slip op. at 11 (ARB Feb.
19, 1997); Artrip v. Ebasco Services, Inc., 89-ERA-23, slip op. at 4-5 & n. 5 (ARB
Sept. 27, 1996); Williams v. TIW Fabrication & Machining, Inc., 88-SWD-3 (Sec'y
June 24, 1992) (citing Enstrom v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 712 F. Supp. 841, 853 (D.
Kan. 1989) ("[a] statutory benefit to plaintiff should not reduce the judgment
against defendant from its wrongful conduct"). But see Densieski v. La Corte Farm
Equip., ARB No. 03-145, ALJ No. 2003-STA-30, slip op. at 7 (ARB Oct. 20,
2004) (the employer received credit not only for earnings at another job, but also
for the unemployment compensation the worker had received. The Board failed to
discuss whether this represented a policy change.).
304. Doyle, 1989-ERA-22, slip op. at 7.
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30 5
and discuss potential opportunities with friends and acquaintances.
The employee must make a reasonable effort to mitigate income loss,
but is not held to the highest standards of diligence.30 6 The benefit of a
30 7
doubt ordinarily goes to the wronged employee.

3. Tax Consequences
The adverse tax consequences of a lump sum damage payment that
represents many years of back pay may lead the ALJ to increase the
damages to compensate for any incremental tax bite.30 8 The employee
9
must accurately and credibly document the additional tax liability. 30
4. Prejudgment Interest
Prejudgment interest is included on back pay, at the rate due for
underpayment of federal taxes. Section 26 U.S.C. 6621(a)(2) sets forth
the rate as short-term federal rate plus three percentage points.3 10
5. Other Terms, Conditions and Privileges of Employment
The value of other terms or conditions or privileges of the lost job
are recoverable, such as:
1. Actual and direct expenses resulting from his loss of a health
plan, including any additional weekly out-of-pocket expense the

305. Id. (quoting Helbing v. Unclaimed Salvage & Freight Co., 489 F. Supp.
956, 964 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (relying on Sprogis v. United Airlines, 517 F.2d 387, 392
(7th Cir. 1975)).
306. Id.
307. Id.

308. Sievers v. Alaska Airlines Inc., 2004-AIR-28 (ALJ May 23, 2005)
(including a $144,000 tax equalization adjustment on $390,000 in lost earnings
reduced to present value because the whistleblower would receive a lump sum that
would otherwise have been paid over his 12 year work life expectancy); Doyle v.
Hydro Nuclear Servs., ARB Nos. 1999-41 to -42,2000-12, No. 1989-ERA-22, slip
op. at 10-11 (Final Decision and Order on Damages ARB May 17, 2000) (finding
the whistleblower's proof failed to justify any award enhancement).
309. Id.
310. Id.
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worker pays for health insurance at a new employer until the
discriminating (i.e., old) employer offers reinstatement; 3 1 '
2. Indirect losses consisting of out-of-pocket medical care
expenses for the worker or dependents that had been covered by the
policy in effect at the discriminating employer, should medical
generous.
benefits the employee obtains at a replacement job be less3 12
care;
chiropractic
or
drugs,
prescription
include
may
These
3. Reimbursement for lost medical benefits or lost disability

insurance;

313

4. Reimbursement for reimbursement for 401(k) retirement plan
contributions the employee would have received, up to the time3 14he
began participating in a similar plan from a subsequent employer;
5. Restoration of sick leave where employer's discrimination
3 15
caused the employee's illness.
D. Compensatory Damages
Compensatory damages make16 a wronged party whole and are not
3
awarded to punish the employer.
1. Elements Included
Compensatory damages are available for a whistleblower's pain
317
and suffering, mental anguish, embarrassment, and humiliation.
Emotional stress and mental anguish must be the "proximate result" of

311. Jackson v. Butler & Co., ARB Nos. 03-116 and 03-144, ALJ No. 2003STA-26, slip op. at 8 (ARB Aug. 31, 2004).
312. Id., slip op. at 9
313. Williams v. T.I.W. Fabrication & Machining, Inc., 1998-SWD-3 (Sec'y
June 24, 1992).
314. Jackson, ARB Nos. 03-116, slip op. at 7.
315. DeFord v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 1981-ERA-I (Sec'y Aug. 16, 1984).
316. Hedden v. Connan Inspection Co., 1982-ERA-3 (ALJ Jan. 22, 1982).
317. See, e.g., DeFord, 1981-ERA-I; Simas, 170 F.3d at 47 (finding a statute

granting "compensatory damages" authorized non-economic damages for the publicly
humiliating way management fired the plaintiff); Waechter v. J.W. Roach & Sons
Logging And Hauling, ARB Case No. 04-183, OALJ Case No. 2004-STA-00043
(awarding $20,000 for emotional distress when the employer falsely accused a truck
driver of stealing the truck he was driving when the employer fired him, resulting in
the driver being jailed for five hours).
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the unlawful discrimination, and the employee has the burden to prove
the magnitude of those injuries.3 18 Though testimony from medical
experts (such as psychiatrists, psychologists, or counselors) is not
required, it strengthens the damage claim.319
Compensatory damages may also be awarded for loss of
professional reputation, medical expenses, and adverse physical health
consequences, such as high blood pressure or depression. District
courts to which SOX cases have been removed have split on this issue.
For example, in Hanna v. WCI Communities, Inc., the district court
found that damages for loss to reputation may be awarded under the
"make whole" remedy of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 320 In Murray v.
TXU Corporation,another district court held that the remedies portion
of the SOX whistleblower provision at 18 U.S.C. § 1514 does not
32
provide for reputational injury. '
This split illustrates the potential for discord Congress introduced
when it gave both the Secretary and the federal district courts
jurisdiction to hear SOX, and now ERA, cases. The Secretary of Labor
has the advantage of building a body of internally consistent case law.
In contrast, federal district courts rarely see SOX or ERA
whistleblower cases. They are less likely to be guided by precedent
from the Department, and rely instead on their greater familiarity with
Title VII cases that are similar but not identical.322 When applying the
SOX and ERA statutes, it will also be difficult for administrative law
judges to keep abreast of both Administrative Review Board decisions,
which they are required to follow, and district court cases, which carry
no precedential weight.

318. Blackburn, 1986-ERA-4.
319. Blackburn, 982 F.2d at 132 n.6 (4th Cir. 1992), aff'd regarding back pay

award, rev'd on other grounds (finding testimony about the employee's emotional
distress due to the termination given by his wife and father were adequate to
support an award). The Secretary ultimately awarded $5,000 for emotional distress
in Blackburn. See Blackburn v. Reich, 79 F.3d 1375, 1376 (4th Cir. 1996); see
also Lederhaus, 1991 -ERA- 13.
320. Hanna v. W.C.I. Cmtys. Inc., 348 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1333 (S.D. Fla.
2004).
321. Murray v. T.X.U. Corp., 2005WL1356444 (N.D. Tex. Jun. 7,2005).

322. Recall the differences in the burden of proof and statutory remedies in
mixed motive cases under Title VII as compared to ERA, AIR 21, SOX and
Pipeline Safety cases. See supra notes 243-260 and accompanying text.
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2. Setting a Compensatory Award
The Secretary requires that compensatory damages be compared
with awards in similar cases to ensure consistency. 323 For many years,
these awards were modest. The Board has recently looked more
closely at the amounts, signaling that those historical awards were low.
The Board determined that damage awards by courts or juries for
violations of state or federal anti-discrimination rights statutes or in
analogous tort actions (e.g., violation of privacy rights) are instructive
when setting damage awards in environmental whistleblower statutes:
We emphasize that there is no arbitrary upper limit on
the amount of compensatory damages that may be
protection
whistleblower
the
under
awarded
provisions enforced by the Department; indeed, as a
practical matter, exclusive reliance on damage awards
in prior whistleblower cases easily could result in the
level of compensatory damages becoming frozen in
time, ignoring even such basic factors as inflation a
result that would be inconsistent with the statutory
be
mandate that the victims of unlawful discrimination
32 4
loss.
their
of
value
fair
compensated for the
Unfortunately, this says nothing about how to make such awards part of
the record; presumably the employee proves those verdicts or awards at
trial.
E. Exemplary Damages
The remedies under the ERA are comprehensive, but "do not
include punitive damages." 325 They have been denied as unauthorized

323. Blackburn, 1986-ERA-4; McCuistion v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 1989-ERA-6
(Sec'y Nov. 13, 1991).
324. Leveille v. New York Air Nat'l Guard, A.R.B. No. 98-079, 1994-TSC-3,
4, Decision & Order on Damages, slip op. at 5 (ARB Oct. 25, 1999).
325. Norris v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 881 F.2d 1144, 1151 (1st Cir.
1989); see also § 585 1(b)(2)(B) (2001).
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under AIR 2 1.326 Similarly, two district courts have held that the SOX
327
statute does not include punitive damages.
Only the Safe Drinking Water Act and the Toxic Substances
Control Act permit punitive damages. The Board applies the standard
found in the Restatement 2 nd of Torts § 908: punitive damages are
appropriate when the employer has shown callous indifference to the
legal rights of others. They "serve in punishment for wanton or
reckless conduct to deter such conduct in the future."32' 8 Violation of
either Act in itself is not enough. "If the purposes of the statute can be
served without resort to punitive measures, the Board does not award
329
exemplary damages."
F. Equitable-typeRelief
The Secretary's remedies may also include orders requiring
posting, located prominently at the workplace, of an order finding a
violation of the employee protection statute(s) and the steps the
employer is undertaking to follow the law in the future.3 30 This type of
remedy is often an aspect of the relief granted in NLRA cases. The
Secretary may order further actions to eradicate discrimination,
including training of managers in their duties under the whistleblower
acts to avoid future violations, or changes to the employer's written
policies (e.g., rescission of a policy that required employees to notify
the company of all contacts with state and federal officials). These

326. Peck v. Safe Air Int'l, Inc., 2001-AIR-3 (ALJ Dec. 19, 2001).
327. Murray, 2004 WL 1356444 at *3-4; Hanna, 348 F. Supp. 2d at 1332-33.
328. Johnson v. Old Dominion Security, No. 86-CAA-3, 4, 5, slip op. at 29
(Sec. Final Dec. and Order May 29, 1991).
329. Jones v. EG&G Defense Materials, Inc., ARB No. 97-129, No. 1995CAA-3, slip op. at 24-25 n. 20 (Sec. Final Dec. and Order Sept. 29, 1998) (citing
White v. Osage Tribal Council, No. 95 SDW-1, ARB, Decision and Order of
Remand, slip op. at 10 (ARB Aug. 8, 1997) (rejecting exemplary damage award
where the Board "fully expects future compliance" with the Safe Drinking Water
Act)). See also Leveille v. N.Y Air Nat'l Guard, ARB No. 98-079, ALJ Nos. 1994TSC-3 and 4, slip op. at 6 (Decision and Order on Damages ARB Oct. 25, 1999)
(affirming the judge's finding that the colonel in the Air National Guard who gave
two negative employment references about the complainant harbored no intent to
harm her and did not act with reckless disregard for her rights).
330. When the OSHA investigation finds in favor of an employee, the
proposed order granting relief often includes an example of the notice to be posted.
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orders do not usurp the equity powers of Article III courts, they
implement the Secretary's statutory obligation to abate the
discrimination.
G. Litigation Expenses
All the Department's whistleblower statutes provide that prevailing
employees will recover their costs, expenses, expert witness fees and
attorney's fees. 3 31 The availability of fee reimbursement leads some

employees to choose the Department of Labor's administrative forum
over the whistleblower remedies available in some state courts. 3 3 2 The
liabilities for litigation expenses are not reciprocal.333 Employers are
334
not awarded fees automatically when a whistleblower claim fails.
A fee petition must detail the work performed, the time spent on the
work, and the hourly rate sought for the lawyers and other professionals
(e.g., paralegals, experts, etc.). 33 5
The presumptive fee is the
appropriate hourly rate times the hours36 reasonably devoted to the
3
litigation, known as the lodestar amount.
No enhancement of the lodestar amount for contingency
arrangements is permitted.3 37 City of Burlington v. Dague was a case
brought before the United States Supreme Court. 3 38 Though Dague

was not a whistleblower case, it involved a fee award under federal
environmental protection statutes.3 39 As outlined in Dague, the
principle of not enhancing fees for contingency applies to all federal
fee-shifting statutes.
Under some whistleblower acts, unsuccessful complainants may be
required to pay small fee awards to the employer if the complaint is

331. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 24.1-.9 (2004), referring to fees "reasonably
incurred."
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Id.

335. For detailed coverage of attorneys' fee issues, see generally ALBA

CONTE,

ATTORNEY FEE AWARDS (3d ed. West 2004).
336. See Id.

337. City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557 (1992); Lederhaus, 91-ERA13.
338. Dague, 505 U.S. at 557.
339. See id.
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"frivolous or has been brought in bad faith., 340 Generally, these fees
are no more than $1,000. Under the Senate version of the AIR 21, bill
fee awards of up to $5,000 might have been made against employees
who brought "frivolous complaints," evaluated under the standard used
in Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 34 1 The Conference
Report did not accept the Senate position; rather, it reduced the
maximum fee amount to $1,000 and referred only to frivolous
complaints without incorporating the Rule 11 standard.3 4 2
Applying the Conference Report language, a judge denied an
employer's fee request after he dismissed all the substantive claims in a
SOX case.3 4 3 He found that the complaint and the employee's conduct
during the litigation failed to show the employee had been "motivated
by animus, bad faith, or a desire to vex [the employer]." 344 Though this
is not the precise verbal formulation the SOX regulations prescribe, it is
345
substantially the same.
V. A FEW PROCEDURAL MATTERS
A. Whistleblower Complaints
Written complaints are required and must be filed at the local Wage
and Hour Division or with OSHA. The employee need not prepare the
complaint personally; the investigator's memorandum of an interview
with the claimant is enough of a writing to qualify. 346 As informal
pleadings, complaints need not set out every element of a claim, and

340. See, e.g., AIR 21 Act, § 42121(b)(3)(C); SOX Regulations, 29 C.F.R. §
1980.109(b) (2004); Pipeline Safety Act, § 60129(b)(3)(C).
341. § 42121 (b)(2)(C).
342. H.R. Rep. at No.106-513 (2000), as reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 80, 15354.
343. Nixon v. Stewart & Stevenson Servs, Inc., 2005-SOX-1, slip op. at 16
(ALJFeb. 16, 2005).
344. Id.

345. Id.; see also Reddy v. Medquist, Inc., ARB No. 04-123, No. 2004-SOX35 (ALJ Sept. 30, 2005) (awarding no fees against the complainant who made an
arguable but unsuccessful showing that the SOX Act applied to a claim of insider
trading).
346. Dartey v. Zack Co., 1982-ERA-2 (ALJ Jan. 29, 1982) (prehearing order
denying motion to dismiss), adoptedSec'y Apr. 25, 1983.
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may be amended liberally during the course of a proceeding. 34 7 The
OSHA Regional Administrator issues a determination upholding or
dismissing the complaint when the investigation is completed.
B. The Administrative Review Board

For many years, the Secretary directly reviewed whistleblower
decisions by administrative law judges. The Administrative Review
Board was created in May of 1996 to issue final decisions on the
Secretary's behalf.348
Those review decisions, whether by the
3 49
Secretary before 1996 or by the Board thereafter, bind ALJs.
The administrative law judge prepares what the federal APA refers
to as a "recommended decision" in whistleblower cases.350 The Board
reviews the recommended decisions in nuclear and environmental, AIR
21, SOX and Pipeline Safety matters only if a party files a timely
petition for review. 351 The judge's decision in those cases actually
functions as an "initial decision," and becomes final on its own unless
the Board affirmatively accepts it for review.35 2 This is analogous to a
Decision and Order in a Longshore and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act case.3 53 This is also an "initial" decision that has
legal effect unless modified or reversed by the Department's other
appellate body: the Benefits Review Board.354 In contrast to all other

347. Ray, 1988-ERA-14.
348. Authority and Responsibilities of the Administrative Review Board, 61
Fed. Reg. 19,978 (May 3, 1996); Final Rule Establishing Administrative Review
Board, 61 Fed. Reg. 19,982 (May 3, 1996).
349. Delegation of Authority and Responsibility to the Administrative Review
Board, 67 Fed. Reg. 64, 272 (Oct. 17, 2002); see also 29 C.F.R. §§ 24.1(a), 24.8(a)
(2004). An ALJ has "no authority... to refuse to follow clearly applicable precedent
from the Secretary . . . ." Lockert v. Pullman Power Products Corp., Case No. 84ERA-15, Sec. Dec., Aug. 15, 1985, slip op. at 2-3; Artrip, 89-ERA-23, slip op. at 5 &
n. 5.
350. 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2001).
351. See AIR 21 Act, §42121(b)(3)(C); SOX Regulations, 29 C.F.R. §
1980.109(b) (2004); Pipeline Safety Act, § 60129(b)(3)(C).
352. See 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2001); see also 29 C.F.R. § 24.7(d) (2004)
(nuclear and environmental); 1979.109(c)-.110(b) (AIR 21), 1980.109(c)-.110(b)
(SOX), 198 1.109(c)-. 110(b) (Pipeline Safety) (2004).
353.33 U.S.C. §§ 901, etseq. (1991),
354. See 33 U.S.C. § 921(b)(1) (2001), 20 C.F.R. § 801 (2004).
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whistleblower matters, the Board automatically reviews recommended
355
decisions under the STAA.
1. The Board's Standards of Review
a) ERA Cases
An administrative law judge's fact finding in the nuclear and
environmental whistleblower cases does not receive deferential review.
In Griffith v. Wackenhut Corp., the Board held that "[n]either §5851 of
the Energy Reorganization Act nor applicable regulations specify our
standard of review. Accordingly, our review is de novo."35 6 The Board
treats the findings of fact and conclusions of law as advisory, yet defers
to a judge's credibility determinations that are based on witness
demeanor. 357 The Board nonetheless must consider the judge's
findings in light of "the consistency and inherent probability of
358
testimony.
Credibility findings are entitled to "special deference" because the
judge 'sees the witnesses and hears them testify . . . ,,,359 The Pogue
court reversed the Secretary's decision in the employer's favor when
the administrative judge had found for the worker. 360 The Secretary
thought that the Navy (the employer) had successfully proved that it
would have taken the same adverse action even in the absence of the
employee's whistle blowing under the Mt. Healthy standard. 36' The

355. § 31105(b)(2)(C), 29 C.F.R. § 1978.109(c)(1) (2004); see also Sabin v.
Yellow Freight Sys. Inc., A.R.B. No. 04-032, No. 03-STA-5, slip op. at 6 (ARB
July 29, 2005); Elliott v. Chris Truck Line, A.R.B. No. 04-132, No. 02-STA-43,
slip op. at 2 (ARB Jan. 28, 2005).
356. Griffith v. Wackenhut Corp., ARB No. 98-067, No. 1997-ERA-52 slip
op. at 9 (ARB Feb. 29, 2000) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2001).
357. Devers v. Kaiser-Hill, ARB No. 03-113, No. 01-SWD-3, slip op. at 4
(ARB Mar. 31, 2005); Shirani v. Comed/Exelon Corp., ARB No. 03-100, No.
2002-ERA-28, slip op. at 2-3 (ARB Sept. 30, 2005); Melendez v. Exxon Chems.
Ams., ARB No. 96-051, No. 93-ERA-6, slip op. at 6 (ARB July 14, 2000).
358. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 496 (1951).
359. Pogue v. U.S. Dept. of Labor, 940 F.2d 1287, 1289, 1291 (9th Cir. 1991)
(quoting NLRB v. Walton Mfg. Co., 369 U.S. 404, 408 (1962)).
360. Id. at 1289.
361. The decision involved a claim under four of the environmental
whistleblower
statutes
(the Comprehensive
Environmental
Response,
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appellate court remanded the claim for an assessment of the employee's
damages, attorney's fees, and entitlement to other make-whole
remedies.
b) All Other Cases
Regulations prescribe that the Board review factual determinations
in cases brought under STAA, AIR 21, SOX and Pipeline Safety
Improvement Acts under the much more deferential "substantial
36 2
evidence" standard.
2. Approvals of Adjudicatory Settlements by the Board or the
Presiding ALJ
The presiding judge approves settlements in cases pending at the
Office of Administrative Law Judges when a whistleblower acts require
the Secretary's approval.363 The environmental acts vary in their
approval requirements. The Toxic Substances Control Act,364 Safe
Drinking Water Act, 365 and Clean Air Act366 require Secretarial review
and approval of settlements, while the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act, Solid Waste Disposal Act and Comprehensive Environmental
367
Response, Compensation and Liability Act do not.
Where the Assistant Secretary is the prosecuting party in an STAA
case, the Assistant Secretary must consent to any settlement agreements

Compensation and Liability Act; the Federal Water Pollution Control Act; the
Solid Waste Disposal Act; and the Toxic Substances Control Act). Id. at 1288 n.1.
Then, as today, those acts contained no requirement for the employer to prove by
clear and convincing evidence that the same action would have been taken in the
absence of a protected disclosure. A preponderance of the evidence would have
sustained the Secretary's finding on the Navy's affirmative defense under a Mt.
Healthy analysis.
362. See §§ 1978.109(b)(3) (STAA); 1979.110(b) (AIR 21); 1980.110(b)
(SOX); 1981.110(b) (Pipeline Safety).
363. See §§ 1979.111(d)(2) (AIR 21); 1980.11(d)(2) (SOX); 1981.111(d)(2)
(Pipeline Safety).
364. 15 U.S.C. § 2622(b)(2)(A) ((2001).
365.42 U.S.C. § 300j-9i(2)(B)(i) (2001).
366. § 7622(b)(2)(A).
367. Beliveau v. Naval Undersea Warfare Center, ARB Nos. 2000-073, 2001017, 2001-019, Nos. 1997-SDW-1, 4, 6 (ARB Nov. 30, 2000).
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between the complainant and the employer before the Board or the
presiding judge can approve it.368 In the much more common situation
where the Assistant Secretary enters no appearance in the STAA
adjudication, the proper procedure for settlement approvals remains
unclear.
In Tankersly v. Triple Crown Services, Inc., the judge granted an
employer's motion for approval of an adjudicatory settlement that had
The
been reached orally with the complainant's counsel.3 69
complainant attempted to renounce the agreement, but the judge found
the agreement binding even though it had not been reduced to
writing.370 The Secretary declined to adopt the approval order because
the record contained no written settlement agreement signed by all
parties or other memorialization of an entire agreement the parties had
consented to. 37 1 The Secretary reasoned that STAA settlements are not
effective until their terms have been reviewed and found to be "fair,
adequate, and reasonable, and in the public interest." 372 Regulations
mandate that "[a] copy of the settlement shall be filed with the ALJ or
the Administrative Review Board, U.S. Department of Labor as the
case may be.",373 As is true for other classes of cases that require
review, settlements will not be approved unless a writing signed by all
parties is submitted, or the record clearly states the settlement terms and
contains an unequivocal declaration by the parties that they have agreed
374
to all of the terms.

368. See Ass't Sec'y & Filer v. Arch Aluminum & Glass, Inc., ARB No. 2001053, No. 1999-STA-12 (ARB Aug. 29, 2001).
369. Tankersly v. Triple Crown Servs., Inc, 1992-STA-8 (ALJ Oct. 20, 1992),
370. See id.
371. Tankersly v. Triple Crown Servs., Inc , 1992-STA-8 (Sec'y Feb. 18,
1993),
372. Id.
373. 29 C.F.R. § 1978.11 l(d)(2) (2004).
374. Hasan v. Nuclear Power Servs., Inc., 86-ERA-24 (Sec'y Mar. 21, 1991),
slip op. at 2 (Order to Show Cause; Final Decision & Order June 26, 1991, petition
for review denied, No. 91-4642 (5th Cir. May 7, 1992)).
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C. Hearingsat the Office of AdministrativeLaw Judges
1. Expedited Proceedings
Either party may request a de novo hearing by a judge on the
complaint. Those trials are expedited proceedings. The nuclear and
environmental statutes give the Secretary of Labor ninety days to
conduct the hearing and issue an order after a complaint is filed.
The STAA, AIR 21 and Pipeline Safety Acts use more general
language: that the hearing "shall be conducted expeditiously."3 75 The
376
Secretary has 120 days to issue a final order after the hearing ends.
The Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Office of Administrative
Law Judges states that trials under those types of statutory
mandates
3 77
hearing.
for
request
the
of
days
sixty
within
should be begin
If the Secretary does not enter a final order within 180 days after a
SOX complaint is filed, and the delay is not due to the bad faith on the
complainant's part, he or she may remove it from the Secretary's
jurisdiction by filing an action for de novo review in the U. S. District
Court.37 8 Employers, on the other hand, have no removal rights. The
SOX regulations require the complainant to file a notice with the
presiding judge fifteen days before removing a case to the district
court.3 7 9 A generally similar removal provision was included in § 629
of the Energy Policy Act of 2005; it permits ERA claimants to litigate
in district court if the Secretary has not issued a final decision within
one year after the complaint is filed, which is double the SOX removal
period of 180 days.
The presiding judge has wide discretion to limit discovery. 380 The
judge may not impose time constraints so tight that they interfere with
the parties' opportunity to have discovery or to obtain evidence to

375. § 31105(b)(2)(C) (STAA), § 42121(b)(2)(A), (AIR 21), § 60129(b)(2)(A)
(Pipeline Safety).
376. Id.

377. 29 C.F.R. § 18.42(f) (2004).
378. § 1514A(b)(1)(B).
379. 29 C.F.R. § 1980.114(b) (2004).
380. Robinson v. Martin Marietta Servs., Inc., ARB No. 96-075, 1994-TSC-7
(ARB Sept. 23, 1996).
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support their positions. 381 The Board treats statutory time periods that
are not backed up with a removal provision as goals, not mandates.
Despite these tight statutory time frames, lawyers who represent
employees rarely want a trial so quickly. All parties commonly agree
to additional time for discovery, and perhaps an attempt to settle with
the aid of a settlement judge. The OALJ does accommodate parties
who are ready for a prompt trial.
2. Subpoenas
None of the whistleblower statutes confer subpoena power
explicitly on the Secretary of Labor or the presiding administrative law
judge. The Solicitor of Labor has stated that he does not believe the
Department's judges have subpoena authority. The Administrative
382
Review Board has gone back and forth on the issue.
One law review article argues that access to subpoenas is a due
process right vested in litigants rather than a power of the forum;
therefore, express Congressional authorization to issue subpoenas is
unnecessary.

383

The Board recently finessed the issue, holding that judges have the
authority to require a party opponent to produce materials, saying:
In regard to a complaint filed under the employee
protection provisions of a number of the
environmental protection statutes that are also
administered by the Department of Labor, a Federal
District Court recently held that an administrative law

381. Timmons v. Mattingly Testing Servs., 1995-ERA-40 (ARB June 21,
1996).

382. Compare Malpass v. Gen. Elec. Co., 1985-ERA-38, 39 (Sec'y Mar. 1,
1984) (stating that judges lack subpoena power under the ERA because the statute
does not specify that power) with Childers v. Carolina Power & Light Co., A.R.B.
Case No. 1998-077, Case No. 1997-ERA-032, slip op. at 5 (Dec. 29, 2000) (stating
that the "express authorization" rule for subpoenas does not apply to administrative
subpoenas and that the statutory mandate to hold formal trial-type proceedings
implies subpoena power).
383. Steven Smith, Due Process and the Subpoena Power in Federal
Environmental,Health and Safety Whistleblower Proceedings, 32 U.S.F. L. REV.
553 (Spring 1998). The author is a former Office of Administrative Law Judges
law clerk.

Spring 2006

Overview of Whistleblower Protection Claims

judge does not have authority to issue a subpoena
without a specific statutory grant of such authority.
[citation omitted]. Regardless of whether the ALJ is
authorized to issue subpoenas pursuant to the STAA,
he clearly does have the authority to take measures to
compel production pursuant to [29 C.F.R.] [s]ections
18.6(d) and 18.21 [of the Office of Administrative
Law Judges' rules of procedure].384
As a practical matter, the Board's decision in Childers v. Carolina
Power & Light Co. gives administrative law judges adequate authority
to issue a subpoena to third parties at a litigant's request. 385 Typically,

it is honored without questioning the subpoena authority. The regular
exceptions, however, are other federal agencies.
In Bobreski v. EPA, a worker who had been fired after he
complained to the EPA about a water treatment facility brought
whistleblower protection claims to OSHA under six environmental
acts. 386 At the Office of Administrative Law Judges, the presiding
judge issued a subpoena for the testimony of the EPA investigator at
the complainant's request. 387 The EPA prohibits investigators from

testifying as a matter of policy, as it may under the U. S. Supreme
Court decision in Touhy v. Ragen.388 The agency offered to provide its
investigator's affidavit. The complainant went to district court to
compel the EPA to honor the subpoena issued by the Office of
Administrative Law Judges. 389 The District Judge found that Congress
had not vested administrative law judges with subpoena power in any
of the environmental whistleblower acts.390 Because five of those six
acts gave some type of subpoena authority elsewhere in those acts, the
court regarded the absence of subpoena power in whistleblower

384. Schwartz v. Young's Commercial Transfer, Inc.. ARB Case No. 2002122, Case No. 2001-STA-33, slip op. at 5 n.8 (Oct. 31, 2003).
385. Childers,ARB Case No. 1998-077, Case No. 1997-ERA-32.
386. Bobreski v. EPA, 284 F. Supp. 2d 67 (D. D.C. 2003).
387. Id.
388. United States ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen, 340 U.S. 462 (1951).
389. Bobreski, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 67.
390. See id.
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adjudication portions of the laws as an intentional Congressional choice
391
and denied enforcement of the subpoena.
3. Trial Evidence
The regulations at 29 C.F.R. § 24.5(e)(1) provide that the general
rules of evidence published in OALJ's Rules of Practice and
Procedure392 do not govern claims under the nuclear and environmental
whistleblower acts.3 93 The OALJ Rules of Evidence follow the Federal
Rules of Evidence closely, and broadly authorizing judges to exclude
relevant evidence for "undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence." 394 In contrast, 29 C.F.R. §
24.5(e)(1) excludes relevant matter only when it is "unduly
repetitious."' 395 The Board found this narrower rule "accord[s] with
Section 7(c) of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 556(d)" and is "consistent with the
nature of the evidence presented in a circumstantial evidence case of
retaliatory intent, some of which may appear to be of little probative
096
value until the evidence is considered as a whole ....
More than a year later, in the comments to the amended final
regulations implementing the Energy Policy Act of 1992, the Secretary
stated that the facts are best evaluated when employees, who may
appear pro se, are not required to present their proof according to strict
evidentiary rules. 39 7 Hearsay evidence often is appropriate proof when
there may be no relevant documents or witnesses to prove
discriminatory intent.3 98 Administrative law judges must determine
the appropriate weight of that evidence.

391. Id.; see also Immanuel v. Dep't of Labor, 139 F.3d 889 (4th Cir. 1998)
(per curiam) (concluding that in enacting the Water Pollution Control Act Congress
did not intend to authorize judges to issue subpoenas, but the judge may require the
employer to produce witnesses under its control).
392. 29 C.F.R. § 18, subpart B.
393. Seater v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 1995-ERA-13, slip op. at 5 n.8 (ARB Sept.
27, 1996).
394. 29 C.F.R. § 18.403 (2004).
395. 29 C.F.R. § 24(e)(1) (2004).
396. Seater, 1995-ERA-13, slip op. at 5 n.8.
397. See 63 Fed. Reg. 6614, 6619 (Feb. 9, 1998).
398. Id.
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Like the nuclear and environmental whistleblower regulations, the
AIR 21, SOX and Pipeline Safety Act regulations adopt only subpart A
of OALJ's Rules of Practice and Procedure.399 The formal rules of
evidence published in subpart B of OALJ's Rules of Practice and
Procedure were not adopted.4 °° Judges may exclude "immaterial,
irrelevant and unduly repetitious" evidence, and are to apply "rules or
principles designed to assure the production of the most probative
evidence.", 40 1 The SOX regulations follow the AIR 21 regulations
SOX statute incorporates by reference AIR 21's
because the text of the 40
"rules and procedures." 2
The STAA evidence regulations, unlike those for all other
whistleblower acts, adopt OALJ's Rules of Practice and Procedure at
29 C.F.R. Part 18 in their entirety, incorporating with them the Rules of
Evidence in subpart B.4 03 This means that the cases in which the
employee is least likely to be represented by a lawyer, the most formal
evidence rules apply.
VI. CONCLUSION

The substantive and procedural law that applies to whistleblower
protection claims the Secretary of Labor adjudicates bear many
similarities to retaliation claims under Title VII, and to several other
employee protection statutes that share a common heritage with the
whistleblower acts. There are important differences in the text of the
many statutes the Secretary of Labor administers, especially with
regard to burden shifting and the remedies available to successful
complainants. Adjudicators and practitioners must ascertain their
circuit's view about what constitutes direct evidence of discrimination
that obviates the use of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
framework for the presentation and analysis of evidence. In addition,
language in the Secretary's regulations that implement the
whistleblower act at issue demands careful attention. Familiarity with
399. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1979.107(a), (d), 1980.107(a), 1981.107(a), (d) (2004).
400. See, e.g., Weil v. Planet Airways, Inc., ARB No. 04-074, 2003-AIR-18,
slip op. at 4 (ARB Oct. 31, 2005) (rejecting a claim that hearsay was improperly
admitted in an AIR 21 matter).
401. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1979.107(d), 1980.107(d), 1981.107(d) (2004).
402. See § 1514A(b)(2)(A).
403. 29 C.F.R. § 1978.106(a) (2004).
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the OALJ Rules of Practice and Procedure and the controversy over
availability of subpoenas in these adjudications will be important points
to consider in preparing these claims for trial.

